Women\u27s Sexual Agency and the Law of Rape in the 21st Century by Oberman, Michelle & Baker, Katharine K.
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2016
Women's Sexual Agency and the Law of Rape in
the 21st Century
Michelle Oberman
Santa Clara University School of Law, moberman@scu.edu
Katharine K. Baker
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
69 Studies in L., Politics & Soc'y 63 (2016)
  
 
 
WOMEN’S SEXUAL AGENCY AND 
THE LAW OF RAPE IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 
 
Katharine K. Baker and Michelle Oberman 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is an article about sex and rape and the messy determinations of consent 
that mark the boundary between the two.  More specifically, the article 
evaluates the modern baseline presumption of non-consent in sexual 
encounters in light of different theories of sexuality (feminism on the one hand 
and sex positivism/queer theory on the other) and in light of how sexuality 
manifests itself in the lives of contemporary young people.  We analyze sexting, 
media imagery and hook-up culture to find that neither feminism nor sex-
positivism provide an accurate account of contemporary sexuality, but neither 
theory gets it all wrong either. The gendered scripts that troubled feminists 
continue to govern many casual sexual encounters. What has changed is the 
extent to which women embrace their own sexual agency and their clear 
rejection of 2nd wave feminism’s messages with regard to gender and sexual 
objectification.   Empirical work confirms that the sexual encounters that many 
young women participate in could be classified as rape under the modern legal 
presumption of non-consent, but most women reject classifying what happens 
as rape.  Their belief in their own agency allows women to construct away their 
injury.  This suggests that nonconsensual sex may not be or is not perceived by 
its victims to be as injurious as some feminists suspected, but it also means that 
sex positivists need not worry about over-deterring sex.  Women who don’t 
feel injured, don’t bring rape charges.  Moreover, our analysis shows that 
despite, or perhaps because of, women’s celebration of their own sexual 
objectification, a great deal of unwanted sex happens, whether consented to or 
not.  This means that while the presumption against consent may not have 
much effect, it likely does little harm, and if it deters anything it likely deters 
unwanted sex, whether consented to or not.     
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When  two  people  have  intercourse   consensually,   what  happens   is  sex. 
When  there  is not  mutual  consent,  what  happens  is rape.  This is a paper 
about  sex and rape and the messy determinations of consent that  mark  the 
boundary between the two. Determining  consent has assumed  center stage in 
the legal endeavor  to criminalize rape. As all who are versed in the problem   
of  rape   convictions   know,   determining   consent   is  complicated. Consent  
is rarely  defined in rape  statutes  and  even if it is, the  definition usually begs 
as many questions  as does the term consent  itself (Committee on  Standard 
Jury  Instructions, Criminal,  of  the  Superior  Court   of  Los Angeles County,  
California,  2013).
1
 
The focus on consent  in rape law is fairly1999 recent. Although  lack of 
consent  was always a conceptual  part  of the crime of rape  (Spohn,  1999, p.  
122), prior  to  the  1970s, there  was  a  little  need  to  focus  on  consent 
because  lack of consent  could  be inferred  from  the  use of force (a tradi- 
tional element of rape), or consent could be inferred from prevalent  taboos 
against  any  sort  of  promiscuous   behavior   on  the  woman’s  part.   Rape 
reform  work  in  the  1970s-1990s  upended  this  traditional  treatment  of 
consent.  In  most  states,  force  was  eliminated  as  a  necessary  element  of 
rape.  Victims’ sexual histories  were declared  irrelevant  as a matter  of evi- 
dence  law.  Forensic   science  all  but   eliminated   mistaken   identity   as  a 
defense to rape. Properly collected DNA evidence now provides definitive 
evidence of sexual activity tied to a particular person.  With such evidence, the 
only defense left to one charged with rape is consent. 
In  the  1980s, influenced  by feminist  writing  about  sex, rape  reformers 
tried to upend  rape law’s traditional approach to consent  by inverting  the 
baseline from which jurors were asked to determine consent. Instead of pre- 
suming  consent  unless  the  prosecution   established  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt   that   the  victim  did  not   consent,   reformers   argued   that,   absent 
evidence of consent, jurors should presume rape. 
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Twenty-five years have passed  since states  moved  toward  a baseline of no  
consent.  During  that  time,  a  rich  body  of  sex positive  literature  has called 
into question  the vision of sex that  inspired the shift to nonconsent. Coupled  
with this literature  is an evident shift in sexual norms  as depicted in  
contemporary media.  These  factors,  along  with  studies  documenting the 
apparent failure of rape reform to ease the road to conviction in acquaintance 
rape cases, suggest a need to reevaluate  the law’s presumptions regarding  
nonconsent  as they apply  to the distinction  between rape and sex. 
This paper takes up the challenge of reconsidering  the legal understand- 
ing of rape  in the early 21st century.  More  precisely, this paper  considers the 
legitimacy of using a baseline presumption of no consent in policing the line 
between rape  and  sex. The section “Modern Rape  Reform”  describes the 
modern  trajectory  of rape reform including the feminist outcry over the 
prevalence of rape, the move to eliminate the force requirement, the adop- 
tion of evidence rules intended  to minimize negative stereotypes  associated 
with women’s sexual behavior, and the evolution to a presumption of “no 
consent” in rape cases. 
The  no  consent  presumption - or  baseline  - relied  on  insights  from 
what  is  now  commonly   referred  to  as  second  wave  feminism  (Harris, 
1990).
2  
Within the legal academy,  second wave feminism includes both  the 
dominance  feminism work of Catharine MacKinnon and the cultural  fem- 
inism of Robin  West.  Second  wave feminist  theory  provided  a blistering 
attack  on the sexual norms and social scripts that governed sexual behavior at 
the genesis of the modern  rape  reform  movement.  This theory,  with its focus  
on  gender,  objectification  and  power,  informed  reformers’  understanding  
of sexuality and thus their conceptualization of rape.  The section “The Second 
Wave Feminist  Account”  explains how the dominance  feminist view of women  
as sexually objectified by men supports  a presumption that  the absence of 
evidence of consent should  be interpreted as rape.  The cultural  feminist view 
of sex likewise supports  this presumption of no consent,  as it views sex as 
both  a source  of pleasure  and  terror  for  women, who often acquiesce to 
sex under  conditions  in which the sex is very unlikely to be meaningful or 
pleasant. 
Second  wave feminism  no  longer  commands  the  academic  or  popular 
influence that  it did when the baseline of no consent first surfaced,  though. 
Second wave accounts  of sexuality gave way to - or were perhaps  pushed aside 
by - very different theories of gender, objectification,  and power. Sex Positivism  
and  much of Queer Theory
3  
describe paradigms  of sexuality in which  sex is 
far  more  liberating,  women  are  far  more  active  and  sexual 
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objectification  is far  less pernicious.  At  a theoretical  level, these views of sex 
make  it  much  harder  to  support   a  presumption of  no  consent.  The 
section “Queer Theory and Pro-Sex Feminist” explores the critical tensions 
between  these different  theoretical  views of sexuality,  particularly as they apply 
to questions of consent. 
The section “Sex Narratives” does not take sides in any debate  between 
feminism and  queer  theory.  Our  concern  is with the present  law of rape. 
The section “Contemporary Sexual Norms  and Practice” therefore  turns to 
the  contemporary world  of sex - at  least straight  sex, analyzing  modern 
cultural  images and projections  of women’s sexuality, and evaluating  if and how 
those cultural images are internalized in contemporary heterosexual practices.
4  
Focusing  on  young,  mostly  middle  class, women,  we describe the world of 
sexting and  hook-ups  to discern how young  people,  particularly young women, 
perceive and experience sex. 
In the section “Mapping the Theory  onto  Reality,”  we evaluate how the 
theories of sexuality explored in the section “Sex Narratives” map onto  the sex 
experienced  by  women  in  the  section  “Contemporary Sexual  Norms and  
Practice.”  Several  conclusions  and  questions  emerge.  Contemporary media  
images  suggest,  and  an  emerging  body  of  research  confirms,  that young 
women portray and perceive themselves as having significant sexual agency.  
Ironically,  the  same  studies  find  that  in  practice,  women  rarely exercise that 
agency during sexual encounters.  The second wave feminist account  of sex as 
something  that  is routinely  done to women remains fairly accurate.  What  is 
new and  challenging  for the law is the growing body  of research  suggesting 
that  women’s embrace  of their own agency leads them to reject the 
characterization of sex they have not consented to, as rape. 
Even as they act within the persistently  gendered  scripts governing  sex- 
ual  interactions,   many  contemporary  young  women  have  internalized  a 
belief in their own agency that  allows them to construct  away the injury of rape.  
Because  they  believe they  could  have  stopped  the  sexual  act,  they were not 
raped. As we explain in the section “Mapping the Theory onto Reality,” one 
possible consequence of young women’s embrace of sexual agency,  even  when  
such  “agency”  involves  having  intercourse  to  which they did not consent,  is 
to compound  and complicate  the reasons  underlying  rapes’  notoriously high  
rates  of  underreporting. Current   thinking  is that  rape is underreported 
because victims may fear stigma or fear of being re-traumatized by the legal 
system.
5  
Our reading of contemporary literature regarding young women’s 
understanding of and expectations  from sexual encounters  suggests that  women 
may not  bring  rape  charges because they do not think of themselves as having 
been raped. 
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The analysis of contemporary culture also shows that sexual agency, 
particularly  among younger women, manifests itself in the embrace of gen- der 
differentiation and  sexual objectification.  By constructing their  bodies as  ideal  
sexual  objects,  with  practices  ranging  from  lingerie  shopping  to breast 
implants  and pubic hair waxing, women are actively embracing  their own sexual 
objectification.  Women’s celebration  of their sexuality as a vehicle to sexual 
empowerment  makes it hard  to argue that  gender and sexual norms are 
imposed on women by men. MacKinnon said, “[A]ll women live in sexual  
objectification  the  way fish live in water”  (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 149). But 
many women, like the fish, appear  to like it.
6
 
Upon   closer  inspection,   though,   it  is  hard   to  understand  what  the 
celebration  of sexuality  is about.  The eroticism  celebrated  in much  of sex 
positivism and queer theory is strikingly absent from accounts of sexual 
encounters  among  straight  young  people.  In  the  place  of a pleasure  dis- 
course is evidence that sex is used instrumentally, both by women and men. 
Second,  wave feminists long ago  noted  that  men use sex as reification  of 
their  own  masculinity,  as a notch  on  the  belt  of masculine  achievement. 
Today,  women appear  to use sex for comparably instrumental reasons, as a 
means  of  showcasing  their  femininity,  situating   their  bodies  as  loci  of 
personal achievement. 
The section “Mapping the Theory  onto  Reality”  reveals gender,  sexual 
objectification,  and casual sexual interactions  as a part of a commercialized 
game,  much  of which  people  profess  to  enjoy  playing.  The  benefits  that 
come from playing this game rarely include the self-determination and sexual 
freedom values that Sex Positivists celebrate, but neither do the costs of playing 
the game seem to include the severe physical and emotional  dangers that  second  
wave feminist  theory  argued  were so prevalent  in rape.  The game does 
produce a good deal of unwanted  sex, however. 
This observation informs our final inquiry into the extent to which 
contemporary  norms   have  undermined   the  justification   for  presuming 
no-consent.  We conclude that,  although  many of the original feminist justi- 
fications underlying this presumption may have crumbled, the harms of retaining  
it  seem minimal.  It  may  do  some  good  and  it  does  almost  no harm.  The 
presumption that  sex, in the absence of consent, is a crime sends a symbolic  
message about  the importance  of mutuality  in sex. That  symbolic message 
exists in tension with norms that  do not require sexual actors to ensure 
mutuality. Because of that tension with real-world norms, the presumption that 
nonconsensual sex is rape seems to have little effect on women’s  likelihood  of  
reporting   or  even  feeling raped.  Nonetheless,   the law does help underscore  
a normative  vision that may get lost in a world in 
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which sex is only about  individual  pleasure.  The argument  against defining all 
sex without  evidence of consent  as rape was that  it might chill sex that, in 
reality, was consensual.  Our conclusions suggest no reason to believe the law 
has had that  effect. To the extent that  the legal baseline of “no”  deters anything,  
it likely deters  unwanted, even if possibly consented  to, sex. As experienced 
now, a significant percentage  of sex between young people, as described by 
young people themselves, lacks pleasure, let alone the sense of mutual  
transcendence  touted  by sex positivists. Indeed, it is often unwanted by both  
women and men, but especially by women. If what the baseline of no  deters  
is unwanted   sex, it  isn’t  doing  much  harm.  If  it  helps  young people,  
particularly young  women,  feel entitled  to  a more  mutual  experience, it could 
be doing much good. 
Our  conclusions  necessarily  beg  bigger  questions  about   what  can  be 
expected of the criminal  law. Criminal  law, in general,  and  criminal  guilt, in 
particular, are  binary.  One  is guilty  or  not.  The  concepts  we explore, agency,  
consent,  and  injury  are  - upon  analysis  - anything  but  binary. Thus,  it is 
possible, and  indeed likely, that  the problems  we describe with rape  law 
enforcement  are an inevitable  result of trying to categorize,  with the criminal 
law’s binary terms, the nebulous  concepts of sexual desire, motivation, and  
conduct.  But unless the law is prepared  to abandon rape as a crime, it must 
always be concerned with how to draw bright lines demarcating the difference 
between permissible and impermissible sexual conduct.  Just enforcement  of 
rape law may therefore require regular examination of the impact of 
contemporary sexual norms and conduct on our understandings of agency, 
consent, and injury. 
Moreover,  our analysis raises as many questions  as it answers about  the 
idea of injury.  We draw  no firm conclusions  about  whether  or how badly 
women who have been pressured into nonconsensual sex, but reject perceiv- 
ing themselves  as having  been  raped,  have  been  injured.  Women’s  resis- 
tance  to seeing themselves as rape  victims does not  necessarily mean  that 
they are unharmed by the nonconsensual sex. Nor  does the law’s labeling 
nonconsensual sex as rape necessarily mean that  women have been injured. 
Our  gut sense, discussed briefly in the section “Mapping the Theory  onto 
Reality,”  is that  even if women do not see themselves as rape victims, they may 
suffer hedonic injury when they engage in and are expected to engage in 
unwanted  sex, especially when that sex seems to be much more about 
objectification,  competition and gender dynamics,  than  it is about  pleasure 
and  eroticism.  But we cannot  establish  the gravity  of this injury  nor  even its 
existence. That  said, we think  we can, and  do, establish  that  the harms that 
come from the law’s criminalization  of nonconsensual sex are minimal, 
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and  the  normative   benefits  of  criminalizing  nonconsensual  sex,  at  least 
given contemporary sexual mores, are important to women’s ultimate  sexual 
empowerment. 
 
 
 
MODERN RAPE REFORM 
 
In the 1970s, a plethora  of nonlegal  feminist scholarship  appeared  describ- 
ing  the  prevalence  of  forced  sex.  Susan  Griffin  (Griffin,  1971),  Diana 
Russell  (Russell,  1974), and  Susan  Brownmiller  (Bownmiller,  1975) pub- 
lished widely read  descriptive  books  on  rape.  These  accounts  did  not  so 
much  expound  on  the  theory  of  rape,
7   
as  they  did  detail  its  ubiquity. 
Coming in the midst of the second wave feminist political movement,  these 
books  helped  fuel  grass  roots  rape  reform  efforts.  Take  Back  the  Night 
Marches aimed to pressure communities to provide women more protection 
from  sexual  assault  (Golden,  Peterson,  Hilgenkamp,  Harper,   & Boskey, 
2010). Public campaigns  sought to destigmatize rape, so as to enable more 
effective enforcement  (Bevaqua,  2000, p. 30). Many  states began to take a 
second look at their rape laws (Spohn, 1999, p. 122). 
The  reform  efforts  tended  to  focus  on  three  areas:  dispensing  with  a 
force requirement,  creating  gradations in kinds of rape,  and restricting  the 
use of evidence involving women’s past sexual conduct.  Force  was the first 
traditional element to go. 
As the rape  literature  worked  its way into  the legal consciousness,  and as 
more women felt empowered  to bring rape charges, it became clear that the 
force element, which required  women to fight back in order  to produce 
evidence of force, required  women to engage in a physical battle  that  they 
were almost certain to lose. Story after story relayed how men were simply so 
much bigger, so much more powerful and so indifferent  to the women’s 
feelings, that  fighting  back  made  no  difference  (People  v. Dorsey,  1980/ 
1982).
8   
Police  departments,  despite  their  reticence  to  pursue  cases  that 
lacked evidence of resistance,  recognized that  victim resistance often led to 
further  violence, and  therefore  advised women not  to resist (Spohn,  1999, p. 
124). No other crime demanded  that a victim resist in the manner that 
traditional rape prosecutions  did and reformers eventually persuaded  many 
state legislatures to dispense with the traditional force requirement  (Spohn, 
1999, p. 124). 
Most   states  then  redefined  the  crime  to  include  various   degrees  of 
offense. Instead  of one prohibition on “rape,”  many statutes  now included 
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“first,”   “second,”   and   “third”   degree  sexual  assault.   Professor   Spohn 
(1999) explains that the degree of rape depends upon a host of variables: 
 
[T]he circumstances  of the offense, the seriousness of the offense (penetration vs. other 
sexual contact),  the type and amount  of coercion used by the offender (a weapon,  phy- 
sical assault, restraint  of some type, threats),  the degree of injury to the victim, whether the 
offender  committed  a felony in addition  to the sexual assault  or had  accomplices, and 
the age and incapacitation of the victim. (pp. 122-123) 
 
This reconfiguration of rape reflected a sense that, however, coercive a sexual 
encounter  with a much more powerful acquaintance might be, it was not likely 
to be perceived, by the victim or a jury, in exactly the same way as would be 
an encounter  with a stranger  wielding a weapon.  Lawmakers rarely specified 
whether  the grading  of sexual assault  offenses reflected the distinct  nature  of 
the injury suffered by victims of different  kinds of rape
9 
or  instead  the  degree 
of culpability  involved  in different  kinds  of rape.
10  
Reformers  accepted the 
proposition that  the law could differentiate  among types of rape, hoping the 
distinctions  would encourage  the state to proceed with prosecutions  of “lesser” 
sexual assaults (BenDor,  1976, p. 152; Marsh, Geist, & Caplan,  1982, p. 21). 
The next major area of reform had to do with the victim’s sexual demea- 
nor  and  history.  Through  the 1970s, rape  trials  routinely  required  victims to 
defend and justify their past sexual behavior  (Berger, 1977). The consent 
requirement  made  the women’s sexual history  relevant  because  the jurors 
were  free  to   conclude   that   (i)  if  she  consented   before   she  probably 
consented  again or (ii) she dressed or behaved in such a way that  she must 
have really wanted it (Baker, 1997, p. 587). Eager to diminish the likelihood of 
either  inference,  reformers  embraced  “rape  shield laws,”  which  barred most   
of  the  evidence  that   allowed  juries  to  make  either  inference  of consent. 
States  took  the lead in establishing  rape  shield laws, but  Congress  fol- 
lowed  suit  in  1978 by  passing  Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  412.  Rule  412 
excludes evidence offered to show prior sexual behavior of the victim and 
evidence offered to show a women’s sexual predisposition. “The  rule aims to 
safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential 
embarrassment and  sexual stereotyping  that  is associated  with the disclo- 
sure of intimate  details” (Rule 412 Committee  Notes, 2012). 
Despite these attempts  to help the criminal law prosecute rape more 
effectively, by the 1990s, there was little evidence that the reforms increased 
either  the  conviction  rate  or  the  number  of cases reported  (Spohn,  1999, 
p. 129). Failure  to secure more  rape  convictions  may have stemmed  from 
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a basic problem  with the criminalization  of rape.  Even when reduced  only to 
a question  of consent, and even without  the women’s sexual history,  the burden   
of  proof   in  rape  prosecutions  poses  an  almost  insurmountable obstacle   
(Baker,   1999,  p.   690;  Bryden   &  Lengnick,   1997,  p.   1316). Conviction  
requires the state to prove, beyond a reasonable  doubt,  that  the victim did not 
consent to sex. 
Always difficult, proving nonconsent became even more onerous once 
premarital sex became  commonplace.  By the  1980s, it was reasonable  to 
assume  that  a woman  might  consent  to  sex on  a date,  with  an  acquain- 
tance, or even with someone she just met. Absent  witnesses or evidence of 
violence, a rape prosecution pits her claim that  she did not consent against 
his claim that  she consented.  In essence, the state must convince the trier of 
fact - beyond a reasonable  doubt  - that this particular victim did not con- sent,  
in spite  of the  fact  that  in comparable   situations  many  women  do consent. 
Further complicating  the prosecution’s  task were social norms inhibiting 
communication and encouraging  female passivity during sexual encounters. 
“[B]oth women and men see it as normal  and natural  for the male to play a 
more  dominant  and  assertive  role  in  a  heterosexual   encounter   and  the 
female to play a more yielding or accommodating role” (Bem, 1993, p. 163; 
Warshaw  & Parrott, 1991, p. 75). These social scripts parallel general gen- der 
scripts that associate independence and action with masculinity and dependence  
and  pleasing  others  with  femininity  (Jackson,   1995,  p.  19). Men  are  
supposed   to  initiate  sexual  activity.  Women  are  supposed   to respond 
either by politely deferring or by quietly playing along; women’s pleasure is mostly 
irrelevant. 
As those  who  studied  rape  in the  1980s and  1990s repeatedly  demon- 
strated  that these scripts have a troubling  by-product:  the cultural  taboo  on 
explicit communication during sexual encounters leads to a great deal of 
miscommunication. Men may understand women who fail to make explicit 
their   nonconsent  as  passive,   but   willing  participants  in  some   sexual 
encounters  (Kanin,  1984, p. 97). Particularly early in a relationship, mis- 
communication  is  deeply  linked  to  acquaintance  rape  (Shotland,  1992, 
pp.  129-130).  One of the most  comprehensive  studies  of sexual attitudes 
found  that  22%  of women  reported  having  been  forced  by a man  to  do 
something  sexual, while only 3%  of men reported  having forced a woman to 
do something  sexual (Michael, 1995, p. 223). Much of this miscommunication 
apparently stems from men’s tendency to interpret  women’s nonverbal  actions  
as indicative  of consent.  Men  are  likely to  interpret  women’s alcohol   
consumption,  eye  contact,   interpersonal  distance,   flirting,  and 
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casual  touching  as indicative  of sexual intent  (Anderson,  2005, p.  1417). 
When asked about  the same nonverbal  activities, women do not necessarily 
view them as indicative of sexual intent,  let alone consent (Anderson,  2005, p. 
1417). 
For many feminists in the legal academy, the solution  to the miscommu- 
nication  problem  seemed  fairly  obvious:  Communicate  Better.  Feminists 
sought to ensure better communication by dislodging the cultural scripts 
mandating silence and  reforming  the law to require  clear manifestation of 
consent. Not only should no mean no, silence should mean no. A man who 
proceeded in the absence of a clear indication of consent should be held 
responsible (Ayres & Baker, 2005, p. 601; Schulhofer,  1998, p. 271; Taslitz, 
2005, p. 446). For example, Professor Michelle Anderson,  who wrote exten- 
sively about  rape  in the early 2000s, suggested there must  be more than  a 
simple  “yes;”  there  must  be  negotiation, a  conversation back  and  forth 
between  participants before  a  man  could  successfully claim  consent  to  a 
sexual encounter  (Anderson,  2005, p. 1406). 
The reform efforts targeting  better communication require defendants  to 
tell a story of affirmative consent. In theory, this requirement  should help 
overcome the formidable  burden  of proof  problem.  Without  an affirmative 
consent  requirement, a defendant  is innocent  as long as the trial narrative 
contains  some ambiguity  with regard  to consent.  With an affirmative  con- 
sent requirement, ambiguity  is not good enough for the defendant,  because 
proceeding  in the face of ambiguity  is a crime. In essence, the affirmative 
consent  requirement  resets the baseline in rape prosecutions.  The baseline 
becomes no.  The jury must  still start  out  believing the defendant,  but  his 
story  must  include a credible account  of why he inferred  the victim’s con- 
sent. In the absence of a credible yes, the jury must assume no. 
Only  a  handful  of  states  have  explicitly adopted   a  baseline  of  no.  In 
State  in Interest  of M.T.S.  (1992),
11  
the New Jersey Supreme  Court  con- 
cluded  that   the  defendant   must  “reasonably  []  believe  that   the  alleged 
victim had  freely given affirmative  permission  to the specific act of sexual 
penetration” (State in Interest of M.T.S., 1992, p. 1278).12  Wisconsin, 
Washington,   and   Florida    adopted    statutes    that    appear    to   require 
affirmative  consent.
13   
Other  states  have  simply  grown  less  sympathetic to  
defendants   who  proceeded   in  the  face  of  ambiguity   with  regard  to consent.   
Although   they  stop  short   of  requiring   affirmative  permission, both   
Massachusetts  and  Maine   have  upheld  convictions   of  defendants who 
claimed they mistakenly believed that the woman consented (Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 2001, p. 966; State  v. Reid, 1984, p. 1296). Many states have adjusted  
the mens rea for rape such that  negligence is sufficient 
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grounds  for a rape  conviction  (Schulhofer,  2003, p. 282). The only way a 
man can ensure that  he is not mistaken  with regard  to consent is to secure 
unequivocal  signs of consent before proceeding. 
The  baseline  of no  consent  sacrifices some  sex for  less rape.  Sex that 
might  happen   if  indicia  of  consent  are  ambiguous   is  discouraged.   The 
baseline of no also inscribes a normative  vision of sex. It encourages one 
particular kind of sex by penalizing other  forms of sex. It encourages  com- 
municative,  cautious  sex and  rejects as too  dangerous  what  some people 
may affirmatively desire: atomistic, hierarchic, and noncommunicative sex 
(Mohr,  1988; Siligson, 2009, p. 101).
14  
Thus,  one’s willingness to accept  a 
baseline of no may turn  on what kind of sex one wants. It is also likely to 
turn  on  what  one  thinks  others  may  want,  why  they  may  want  it,  and the 
role that  sex and  sexuality  play people’s understanding of themselves. The 
section “Sex Narratives” turns to that discussion in more detail. 
 
 
 
SEX NARRATIVES 
 
Sexual encounters  are rich in underlying  narratives.  Whether  for procrea- 
tion  or  for  pleasure,  whether  brought   on  by  a  seemingly  uncontrollable 
urge or by cautious  seduction,  sexual encounters  reflect at least two, and in the 
case of conflict, three or more perspectives or stories: those of the parties 
involved and those of the people who, in retrospect,  seek to understand the 
encounter.  All of those perspectives are informed by background beliefs about  
how sexuality  functions  in people’s lives. In this section,  we review the  
competing  theoretical   frameworks   of  sexuality  employed  by  second wave  
feminists  and   sex  positivists,   analyzing   the  implications   of  each account 
for rape law. 
 
 
 
The Second Wave Feminist Account of Sex 
 
Much of the discussion of sex in the 1980s and 1990s, when the affirmative 
consent standard was first being articulated and adopted  by courts, was informed   
by  second  wave  feminism.  Second  wave  feminism’s  view  of sexuality    is   
not    a    particularly     pleasant    one.    “Sexuality,”    wrote Catharine  
MacKinnon,   “is   the   dynamic   of   control    by   which   male dominance  … 
eroticizes and thus defines man and woman,  gender identity and  sexual  
pleasure”  (MacKinnon, 1989b,  p.  137). “Man  fucks  woman; 
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subject verb object” (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 124). Sex, the act, is a mechanism 
for  men  to  assert  dominion  over  women.  Femininity  - the  state  of being 
female and the state of being sexual - “becomes women’s identity to women 
because it is imposed through  men’s standards for desirability in women” 
(MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 8). Men objectify women sexually because men want  
sexual objects that  they can control.  Women  become commodities in a process 
that MacKinnon called “the thingification of women” (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 
8). 
Patriarchy, as described by MacKinnon, is a fully coherent, if horrifying, 
system of male dominance.  Women’s differences from  men do not  justify or 
explain  masculinity  or femininity.  Women’s differences are constructed by 
patriarchy so that  men can dominate  women and extract their sexuality. Male  
power  then  gets  protected   as  sexual.  “Male  dominance  is sexual. Men … 
sexualize hierarchy”  (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 127). “Women are socialized to 
passive receptivity … submit to survive” (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 177). Although  
MacKinnon acknowledges  there might be such thing as sex as distinct from 
rape, “for women,”  she writes, “it is difficult to distinguish the two under  
conditions  of male dominance” (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 174). As for consent 
demarcating the difference, she suggests “when a woman  accepts what would 
be rape if she did not  accept it, what happens is sex” (MacKinnon, 1989b, p. 
134). 
One consequence of MacKinnon’s conflation  of rape and sex was confu- 
sion  as to  why,  from  the  women’s perspective,  rape  was so much  worse 
than  sex. According to MacKinnon “[t]he injury of rape lies in the meaning of 
the act to its victims” (MacKinnon, 1983, p. 652). Nonetheless,  she was 
routinely  and accurately  quoted  as saying “for women it is difficult to dis- 
tinguish  [rape  from  sex]  under   conditions   of  male  dominance” 
(MacKinnon, 1989a, p. 174). By labeling as rape  much of what  the world 
called sex, MacKinnon raised crucially important questions about  women’s 
agency and their control  of their sexuality under  conditions  of male domi- 
nance. But she left unanswered  whether,  and to a certain  extent why, rape 
was any worse than  most  sex. “What  is wrong  with rape,”  she wrote,  “is that  
it is an  act of subordination of women  to  men”  (MacKinnon, 1983, p. 652). 
But so, according to her, was a good deal of sex that was not rape. 
MacKinnon’s totalizing  view of  sex as  oppressive  was  not  uniformly 
accepted by feminists. Many pro-sex feminists decried what they saw as 
Mackinnon’s inherent  endorsement  of a repressive, rigidly regulated  world of 
sex (Abrams,  1995, pp. 304-305).  One major  flashpoint  for the debate 
between the pro-sex feminists and MacKinnon revolved around  the regula- 
tion  of  pornography  (Abrams,   1995,  pp.  304-305).  The  celebration   of 
Women’s Sexual Agency and the Law of Rape in the 21st Century 75  
 
 
sexual  liberation  among  the  pro-sex  feminists  did  not  endorse  or  seek to 
protect  predatory behavior  by men, but  argued  that  the only way women 
could assume the control  they needed in sexual encounters  was to live in a 
world in which their sexuality was not  so rigidly regulated  (Abrams,  1995, pp. 
312-314). 
Within  the  legal academy,  Robin  West  and  a  group  that  came  to  be 
known  as cultural  feminists took  a somewhat  different approach to sexuality. 
While acknowledging  how  violent  and  dangerous  sex could  be, West also 
emphasized that  women often found joy in sex. Indeed, there was even joy to 
be found in subordination. And this paradox  is what makes the criminalization  
of rape so hard.  “[S]exual submission  has erotic appeal  when it is an expression 
of trust; is damaging  and injurious  when it is an expression of fear; and  is 
dangerous  because  of its ambiguity”  (West, 1987, p. 129). “The  profound 
existential  fact - that  the most  primal  source  of pleasure located  in one’s 
own body  is a source of danger  and  constitutes  a risk to one’s survival - is 
something  all women must  somehow  learn to live with and it is something only 
very few men ever confront” (West, 1997, p. 114). 
Rape  is something  all women fear and  they fear it because its injury  is 
profound. Both violent and nonviolent  rapes involve “assaults on the body. 
Both are experienced and typically described as more like spiritual  murder 
than  either robbery  or larceny”  (West, 1993, p. 1447). “The  experience of 
rape  is shot  through  with an unwilled  invasion  of the body,  fear of one’s 
own imminent  death  and the pain of nonconsensual physical touching  …” 
(West, 2010, p. 232). The harm from rape comes from “the sure knowledge 
that  one’s will is irrelevant,  the immediate  and total  reduction  of one’s self to 
an inanimate  being for use by another.” (Id.) 
West is very clear that  consented  to,  yet unwanted,  sex is not  rape.  It 
does not involve the same kind of injury.
15  “There  is quite a felt difference 
between those coercive forces that  elicit consent  - no matter  how bad the 
bargain  struck  - and  the coercive force employed  by an actor  who over- 
rides or ignores the lack of consent …” (West, 2010, p. 226).16  Nonetheless, 
unwanted  sex, particularly  when consented  to repeatedly,  in the absence of 
erotic desire, may be injurious.  What  happens  to women’s relationships  to 
their  own  sexuality,  their  own  eroticism,  and  their  own  sexual  desires if they 
routinely say yes to sex that they would rather  not have? 
MacKinnon’s discussion of rape raised questions  about  why sex is ever 
different  than  rape.  West answers  that  by explaining  that  rape  involves a 
spiritual injury, “a breakdown of selfhood” (Halley, 2006, p. 63),17  that 
consensual  sex does not. Not all unwanted  sex involves that  kind of injury, 
though the prevalence of unwanted  sex may suggest an equally troublesome 
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problem.  “Why,”  West  (1993) asks,  “is it okay  for  her  to  have  sex even 
though  she does not  want  to,  but  not  okay  for him to not  have sex even 
though  he wants to? Why is the implied background norm  what he wants” (p. 
1456)? 
In asking that  question,  West raised the baseline issue. A world in which it 
is routine  to say yes to unwanted  sex but uncommon to condemn  a man for  
pressuring  a woman  into  unwanted  sex is a world  with a baseline  of consent.  
If sex is mostly good, not particularly  harmful  and makes at least one person 
happy,  why not assume that  most sex is fine? In asking why we preference the 
man’s interest in having sex over the women’s interest in not having  it, West 
calls into  question  the baseline of consent.  Why not  start from no (West, 
1993, p. 1451)?
18
 
Many  of  the  rape  reform  efforts  described  above  took  that  question 
seriously and  pushed  the law, in a variety  of ways, toward  that  baseline. But 
as the legal academy  and  law reform  efforts  were struggling  with the issues 
surrounding rape  and  consent,  scholars  outside  the  legal academy were 
taking issue with the feminist theories of sexuality that  first problematized the 
distinction  between rape and sex. We turn to that literature  next. 
 
 
 
Sex-Positivists’ Narrative Account of Sex 
 
In a highly influential article, anthropologist Rubin  (1984) argued  that  one 
must  be  careful  not  to  make  feminism  into  too  much.  “Feminism,”   she 
wrote,  “is the theory  of gender  oppression.  To automatically assume  that 
this  makes  it  the  theory   of  sexual  oppression   is  to  fail  to  distinguish 
between gender, on the one hand,  and erotic desire, on the other”  (Rubin, 
1984, p. 169). Attention to erotic desire, how it might and might not be liberating,  
why it might and might not be gendered, how it might or might not influence 
and be influenced by power, how one is internally  and externally identified by 
it, bred a flood of writing about  sexuality. Sexuality studies now constitute  a 
broad,  deep, and rich body of scholarship.  Our focus will be on those  parts  
of the scholarship  that  address  feminism in general and rape, or unwanted  
sex, in particular. 
One of the most glaring omissions from second wave feminism’s account of  
sexuality  was  any  meaningful  explanation  of,  let  alone  narrative   for, same 
sex-attraction. If “man fucks woman” is “subject verb object” (MacKinnon, 
1983), what  grammatical  diagram  explains  man  fucks  man or woman fucks 
woman? 
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At times, feminists seemed to argue that same sex relationships  were deri- 
vative of heterosexual  power relations. Catherine  MacKinnon suggested that 
although  a man may have sex with a man, what they are often manifesting in 
that  sex is the same kind of power relations  that  control  heterosexual  sex 
(National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization,  Inc., 1996). By con- 
trast,  cultural  Feminism  seemed to legitimate  - even lionize - lesbianism, but 
it has been criticized for condemning  much of gay male culture (Halley, 
2006, pp. 64-66).
19  
and  “delet[ing] women’s desire for phallic masculinity” 
(Halley, 2006, p. 66). 
For  many  women,  feminism’s demonization of power  relations  within sex 
also simply failed to provide enough of a reason to reject as illegitimate their 
own erotic experiences and desires. West (1987) herself acknowledged that  
subordination in sex could be pleasurable.
20  
A theory  - or at least a political  
movement  - that  declares  certain  forms  of erotic  pleasure  “suspect”  must  
offer  desirable  alternatives,  or  the  movement  is not  likely to stay  strong.  As 
two  20-something  feminists  wrote  in the  1990s, “we live [our] desires through  
the discourses of patriarchal romances,  not feminism. And  the irony  is that  
we know  it, but  that  does not  make  the desires go away” (Gill & Walker, 
1993, p. 69). 
Moreover,  power within individual  relationships  often seems to ebb and 
flow and  sometimes to switch sides. Queer theorists  inside and  outside  the 
legal academy argued that the feminist account of power was not wholly 
inaccurate,  it was just  wholly  incomplete.  Drawing  on  the  poststructural 
work  of Michel Foucault, queer  theorists  offered  a very different  view of 
sexual power (Foucault, 1980, p. 39). Power is ubiquitous and inevitable, in sex 
as in everything  else. Sexualities are constructed by interacting  norms of sex, 
gender, and  deviance. One’s sexuality is not  simply a function  of a hierarchical  
system of male dominance.  It is a function  of a complex web of interacting,  
discursive, evolving relationships, the power in which is not fixed. That is why 
there can be such diversity in erotic desire
21  
and why one cannot  condemn  
sexual  acts  simply  because  they  create  and  perpetuate power relationships. 
Virtually  everything  does that.  Thus, as Halley (2006) summarizes,  much  queer  
theory  accepts  feminism’s idea that  “sexuality  is shot  through  with power,  but  
it is much  more  open  to  the  idea  that  the result is only episodically, not 
structurally, domination” (p. 114). 
Acknowledging  the ubiquity of power relationships  in sex does not necessarily  
mean   condoning   all  use  of  power   in  sexual  relationships, though  for 
many queer theorists,  the price of regulating  that  power is too great.  Many  
pro-sex  theorists  concede that  sex can be, and  perhaps  often is, dangerous  
for women. But that  danger may have its own positive erotic 
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potential.   Danger   is an  inevitable  part  of  sex.  Professor  Franke   (2001) 
writes: 
 
[D]esire … risks  bumping  up  against  danger.  Feminist  legal  theory  often  dismisses this 
… as false consciousness, or worse, women imitating  male sexuality. But to evacuate women’s 
sexuality of any risk of confrontation with shame, loss of control,  or objectification strikes 
me as selling women a sanitized meager simulacrum  of sex not  worth getting riled up about  
…. It is precisely the proximity to danger, the lure of prohibition, the seamy side of shame 
that  creates the heat that  draws us toward  our desires … It is also what  makes  pleasure,  
not  a contradiction of or haven  from  danger,  but  rather  a close relation.  (pp. 206-207) 
 
Halley (2006), commenting  on the title of Pleasure and Danger, a forma- 
tive collection of pro-sex feminist essays, notes that  the title “puts  pleasure and  
danger  into  conjunction  (as in “salt  and  pepper”).  It affirms that  sex has  a  
dark   side”  (p.  117).  MacKinnon  argued  that   patriarchy  erotizes violence 
and domination. Much of queer theory agrees, but defends that dynamic 
precisely because of its erotic content. 
At a minimum, pro-sex theorists argue, feminists must stop constantly harping  
on the danger.  “The  overwhelming  attention we have devoted  to prohibitions 
against  bad or dangerous  sex has obscured,  if not  eliminated, a category of 
desires and pleasures in which women might actually want to indulge”  (Franke,  
2001, p. 200). If danger  must  be controlled  it should  be controlled  only  to  
insure  that  women  are  not  chilled from  seeking erotic desire. As Vance 
(1993) wrote,  the goal should  be to “reduce  the dangers women face and  … 
expand  the possibilities,  opportunities and  permission for pleasure that  are 
open to them” (p. 290). Danger  “is bad not because it realizes male dominance 
but because it deters women from being sexually adventurous, from seeking and 
finding pleasure” (Halley, 2006, p. 117). 
Throughout almost all of this pro-sex and queer critique of second wave 
feminism,  there  is an  undeniable   celebration  of  the  erotic  as  liberating. In 
Glick’s (2000) words,  contemporary queer theory  “encourages  us … to fuck  
our  way  to  freedom”  (p.  19).22   Much  contemporary writing  in  the legal 
academy adopts  this strongly pro-sex stance. 
Professor  Cornell (1998) writes that  “our  sexuate being and the way we 
choose to represent  ourselves sexually is basic and personality-defining and 
must therefore  be protected  by any meaningful  concept of liberty and con- 
science” (Cornell,  1998, p. 33). Writing  in response  to  Lawrence v. Texas 
(2003), Professors Rosenbury and Rothman (2010) argue that Lawrence 
inappropriately cabins a constitutional right to sexual activity within the context  
of intimate  relationships  (p. 809). It  is the  sex, not  the  intimacy, that they 
argue must be protected  because intimate relationships  “can mask 
Women’s Sexual Agency and the Law of Rape in the 21st Century 79  
 
 
various  dynamics  that  sustain  gender and sexual hierarchies,  thereby  making 
those hierarchies  seem natural  or inevitable  rather  than  the product  of social 
or legal construction” (Rosenbury  & Rothman, 2010, p. 837). In the name of 
toppling  those hierarchies,  they suggest that  sex must be liberated from cultural  
constraints in order for individuals to express themselves and their identity. 
Their  framing  of a right  to  sexual activity  presents  a stark  contrast  to the 
second wave feminist critique of sex: “[W]e contend  that the recognition of  a  
right  to  intimate  association  requires  the  recognition   of  a  right  to engage 
in consensual  sexual activity without  regard  to the motives or goals behind the 
activity” (Rosenbury  & Rothman, 2010, p. 863). 
This disregard  of motives is striking.  The second wave feminist account of 
sex focused on men’s motives in order to explain why sex was dangerous, how 
it could subordinate and  why it often felt frightening,  painful  and/or hollow 
for women. Men’s motives were either pernicious,  a desire to dominate women, 
or just pathetic,  selfish, indifferent,  and rooted  in a commodified understanding 
of sex. Rosenbury and Rothman (2010), in the name of breaking  down  sexual  
hierarchy,  dispense  with  the  motive  question  altogether. It does not matter  
if the motive was bad, because sex is good. 
Rosenbury and  Rothman (2010) do  not  erase rape  as a crime.
23   
They 
acknowledge   that   the  sex  must   be  consensual   to   be  legal,  but   their 
approach almost  certainly  endorses  a  return  to  the  baseline  of  consent. 
There is something  so liberating  about  sex itself, with its seemingly infinite 
sources of pleasure (Rosenbury  & Rothman, 2010, p. 863), with its relationship  
to  “identity  and  self-expression”  (Rosenbury  & Rothman, 2010, p.  836), with  
its “heat  that  draws  us toward  our  desires”  (Franke,  2001, p. 207), that  it 
seems safe to assume that  everyone wants it. For  sex positivists, the legal 
academy has spent too much time “theorizing  circumstances in which ‘no’ is 
the right answer to a sexual encounter,” and needs to start thinking  about  the  
“conditions under  which we would  be inclined  to  say “yes” (Franke, 2001, p. 
206). 
Before turning  to how these theories  of sexuality map onto  contempor- 
ary young  women’s experiences, a note  on gender is in order.  Recall that 
according  to MacKinnon gender is about  sexuality, which in turn  is about 
male dominance.  “[T]he ruling  norms  of sexual attraction and  expression 
are fused with gender identity  formation and affirmation  such that  sexuality  
equals  heterosexuality   equals  the  sexuality  of  (male)  dominance   and (female) 
submission”  (MacKinnon, 1989a, p. 177). Femininity  is “imposed” on women 
“through men’s standards” (MacKinnon, 1989a, p. 8). If gender and the 
objectification  of gender is always about  subordination, it is always 
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suspect.  The contemporary critique  of gender is not  so unlike the original 
critique of MacKinnon’s views on sexuality: Gender  can be fun (Crawford, 
2007, p. 120).
24  
Today,  women can take control  of their own bodies, dress 
them and shape them and use them as they please. That  capacity, for many 
young women, feels like the essence of agency and empowerment,  although as 
we explain in the section “Contemporary Sexual Norms  and  Practice,” the 
pressure many women feel to dress and shape their bodies to perfection may 
make us question  the extent to which the embrace of gender is, in fact, 
empowering. 
 
 
As Applied to Rape Law 
 
The competing  sex narratives  of second wave feminists and  sex positivists 
underscore  the challenge of drawing  the line between sex and  rape.  If one 
accepts the second wave feminist account  of sexuality, according  to which sex 
and gender are primarily  subordinating mechanisms employed by men, 
consciously  or  subconsciously,  to  maintain  power  over  women,  one  need 
not  be tremendously  concerned  if the  law of rape  draws  a  baseline  that 
may over-deter  sexual activity. If the physical and emotional  harms flowing from  
nonconsensual sex are profound and  permanent, then  we should  be vigilant 
in policing rape. 
On the other  hand,  if, as much of pro-sex theory  proclaims,  sex, unbur- 
dened  by  traditional  notions   of  gender  and  intimacy,  allows  people  to 
realize joy, self-expression, identity and desire, then we need to be very con- 
cerned  about  a  baseline  that  over-deters  sex. If  fear  and  danger  are  an 
inevitable, but not inevitably damaging  or destructive,  part  of sexual activity, 
and if very few women get hurt  (and even then,  perhaps  not  so much) by 
nonconsensual sex, then  there  is little justification  for  presuming  that sex is 
nonconsensual. 
Recall that  the baseline of “no”  was rooted  in the idea that  so much sex is 
actually unwanted  that,  even if consent is hard  to determine,  a presumption  
against  consent  was not  likely to be counterfactual. For  pro-sex  and queer  
theorists,  the  baseline  of  no  may  not  only  be  counterfactual, but worse, it 
sends a normative  message about  appropriate sex that  is antithetical  to  the  
autonomy, liberty  and  re-inventive  potential   inherent  in  fully realized sexual 
desire. 
With that  summary  in mind, we turn  in the next section to contempor- 
ary sexual norms and empirical work that  explores how sexuality functions in  
young  people’s  lives. Some  of  what  we document  suggests  significant changes 
in sexual norms  over the last 40 years. These changes  may reflect 
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the influences of both feminism and queer theory or they might reflect influ- 
ence and growth  from completely different  sources. We do not address the 
source of the change. Much  of what we observe suggests no change at all, but 
reflects persistent  gendered patterns  in sex. 
We  are  aware  that  by  focusing  on  young  people  we are  generalizing 
from a population that is relatively less experienced and more vulnerable to 
coercion. Young people may be less likely to experience the self-actualization and  
identity  formation that  the  pro-sex  endorsement of sex celebrates.  It may 
be that  to live the kind of life that  much of pro-sex theory  valorizes, one  
needs  a maturity  and  sense of self that  most  young  people  lack.  By focusing 
on the young,  we may be skewing our  conclusions  in favor  of a more 
protectionist regime. 
We nonetheless think it appropriate to focus on the young for several reasons. 
First, statistically speaking, the young are most vulnerable to rape (Acierno,  
Resnick,  Kilpatrick, Saunders,  & Best,  1999, p.  543). Second, much of what 
we analyze involves the behavior  of college students,  most of whom are legal 
adults. For better or worse, the freedoms enjoyed or desired by  sophisticated, 
discerning  30-year  olds  must  also  be afforded  to  naive and  oafish  18-year  
olds,  because  that  is where  the  law draws  the  line  of adulthood. Third,  we 
suspect  that  one’s early  experiences  with  sexuality may affect later sexual 
experience and desire. 
 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY SEXUAL NORMS AND PRACTICE 
 
In this section, we review current  research and contemporary norms sur- 
rounding  sexual encounters.  We begin with the much-touted advent of sext- 
ing, which reflects a significantly more public, or potentially  public, form of 
flirtation  than  in generations  past.  We then  turn  to  an  account  of social 
media,  looking  to  depictions  of women’s display  of sexual agency as evi- 
dence of a counter-narrative to the victim-centered trope of second wave 
feminism. Finally, we examine current  research governing casual sexual 
encounters,  known colloquially as “hook-ups.” 
 
 
 
Sexting 
 
Students  of all ages have been passing  notes,  many  with sexual overtones or  
innuendo,  for  decades,  but  as numerous  public  figures whose sexually explicit 
e-mails and  text  messages have disrupted  their  careers  can attest, 
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flirtation-communication looks different today. The internet and cell-phones have 
given rise to new ways of messaging. The newer twist on flirtation- communication 
arising from this medium of communication is called “sexting,” which has been 
defined as “the practice of sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages 
and images, including nude or semi-nude photo- graphs  via cellular telephones  
or over the Internet” (Miller v. Skumanick, 
2009, p. 637). It is very common.  As of May 2010, 20% of teens had posted or  
texted  nude  or  semi-nude  photos  of themselves  (Melby,  2010, p.  1).
25
 
Thirty-nine  percent  had  sent  sexually  suggestive texts  or  e-mails  (Melby, 
2010, p. 1). These  messages have  become  commonplace  among  relatively 
young teens (Hoffman,  2011, p. 1). As one reporter  concluded in a story 
documenting the  legal and  emotional  fall-out  from  the  “viral”  spread  of a 
text message containing  a photo  of a naked 8th grade girl: “For  teenagers, who 
have ready access to technology  and are growing up in a culture  that celebrates 
body flaunting, sexting is laughably easy, unremarkable and even compelling: 
the primary  reason  teenagers  sext is to look  cool and  sexy to someone they 
find attractive” (Hoffman,  2011, p. 1). 
Often it can be more complicated  than  that  though.  Some evidence sug- 
gests that  sending nude  photos  is not  simply a new way of flirting, but  is 
something   that   boys  pressure   girls  into  doing  (National  Campaign   to 
Prevent  Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy,  2010, p. 4).
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In one study,  51% 
of the teen girls polled  thought  their  peers texted  because  boys pressured 
them to do so, though  only 12% of teen girls indicated that they themselves 
had  been pressured.  (National Campaign  to Prevent  Teen and  Unplanned 
Pregnancy,  2010, p. 4). Stories abound  of girls who were humiliated  when 
their  boyfriends  forwarded  a sext to  others  (Celizic, 2009; Inbar,  2009).
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Far  fewer stories exist of girls doing the same, and empirical work suggests that  
boys  may  pressure  girls  to  “sext”  far  more  often  than  the  reverse (Celizic, 
2009; Inbar,  2009). 
Some girls almost certainly sext on their own because they take comfort and  
pride  in their  developing  bodies (Hoffman,  2011, p. 1). That  comfort and 
pride may come with a dark  side though.  Many  young girls’ obsession with  
their  bodies  today  verges  on  the  pathological.  British  psychologist Susie 
Orbach  (2008) writes, “hatred  is too mild a word for [girls’] relation- ship  with  
their  physicality”  (p.  227). Two-thirds  of young  women  report wanting  plastic  
surgery  (Orbach,  2008, p.  220). As we will discuss more fully below, for 
many girls and young women, sexual experiences are primarily fora for 
displaying their bodies as “sites of achievement”  (Orbach, 
2008, p. 227). So even for those girls who sext willingly, without undue pressure,  
sexting  may  reflect  an  obsession  with  and  objectification   of 
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one’s body - a “thingification” - that  raises concern  for many (Orbach, 
2008, p. 227). 
Sexting emerges not only as a complicated  modern  manifestation of sexual  
norms,  but  also  as  a  reason  to  call into  question  the  sex narratives invoked  
by theorists-feminist  and  otherwise.  The  fact  that  only  12%  of the many  
girls who take  and  send sexually charged  pictures  of themselves admit to 
having been pressured  to do so suggests a degree of sexual agency and 
confidence that undermines  the feminist trope that women are so socialized 
into passivity that  we cannot  expect them to assert themselves during sexual 
encounters. Sexting might also indicate the sender’s comfort with sexuality and 
the sexual nature  of her body. That  sexting has become commonplace  might 
lead one to believe we’d finally evolved into a culture that permitted  women 
to experience the kinds of sexual pleasures  that  were for centuries  denied  
them.  It  also  suggests  an  acceptance  of public  sexuality that would be 
celebrated by many sex positivists.
28
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  a  much  higher  percentage  (51%  vs. 
12%) of teen girls think  that  girls send pictures of themselves because boys 
pressure  them,  suggests a far more  traditional dynamic  of male initiation 
and  female acquiescence.  For  some,  sexting just  involves a new platform for 
the demonstration of an age-old sexual script involving men pressuring women 
to perform  sexually. Sexting may just reflect the ongoing  power of the male 
gaze, with its perpetuation and dissemination  of pornographically stylized  
images  of  the  female  body.  Some  women  are  willing  to  forego the privacy 
traditionally associated with the disclosure of sexual histories (Palfrey & Gasser, 
2008, p. 71), but those women who need to be pressured into sexting may still 
want some of that  privacy. In reality, many girls are likely conflicted  about  
how  much  privacy  they  want,  how  much  privacy they  think  they  have  a  
right  to,  and  how  to  project  themselves  as  both whole and sexual persons. 
This conflict is probably  all the more difficult for them because their  embrace  
of their  body’s sexuality is accompanied  by a fixation on perfection  and  body  
commodification that  seems at odds  with female empowerment. 
Sexting offers  girls the  opportunity to  be publicly  sexual  in a manner that  
more  conservative  sexual norms  denied  them,  but  the fact that  some girls 
take advantage  of that opportunity, while others seem to need to be pressured  
to do so, and many probably  feel simultaneously  empowered and pressured,  
does  not  tell  us  that  much  about  the  extent  to  which  young women  
actualize  their  agency.  And  to  the  extent  that  sexting,  like  sex itself
29   
seems 
to  be as much  about  presenting  the body  as perfect  as it is about  presenting  
the body  as sexual, it may not  be particularly  liberating. 
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It is hard  to believe that  the way to widespread  sexual self-actualization  is 
through  adherence  to the principle that  we must all look like models. The 
next  section  delves more  deeply into  the  messages that  those  models  and 
other media images send about  sexuality. 
 
 
Contemporary Media 
 
It seems that every generation  of adults professes dismay at the next generation’s  
norms  around   sexuality.  We  do  not  claim  that  contemporary media’s 
embrace  of sexual imagery  is somehow  more  dramatic  or  important  than  
when Elvis swiveled his pelvis in public,  some 60 years ago.  In the discussion  
below, we simply explore the sexual messages that  are conveyed in two modern  
music videos, separated  by almost 10 years, but both conveying important 
messages about  women’s sexuality (Wallis, 2011).30 
The Milkshake  Song dates  back  to  2003 (Kelis,  2009).31   The  full first 
line, repeated  at least 8 times in the song is “My  Milkshake  Brings All the 
Boys to the Yard.”  In the video, Kelis, the singer/“narrator,” dressed  in a 
low cut halter top and tight fitting jeans, enters and dances around  a diner. 
She bends and contorts  her body in ways that  clearly emphasize her breasts 
and bottom. The imagery from the diner amplifies the effect, two buns com- 
ing out of the oven, two eggs frying. Kelis deliberately  dances in the men’s 
faces. She shakes  her breasts  and  her butt  at  them  as they eat.  She sucks 
long  and  hard  on  a  straw  and  gobbles  up  a  cherry,  licking  the  whipped 
cream underneath it. There is nothing  remotely subtle about  this video. 
By the end of the video,  men are lining up outside  the diner  trying  to 
peek in, but  Kelis is not  interested  in them.  Instead,  her chosen audience, 
throughout the video, is the chorus  line of other  girls working  with her in the 
diner. The song’s full refrain is “My milkshake brings all the boys to the yard  
and they’re like, ‘It’s better  than  yours.’ Damn  right,  it’s better  than yours. 
Can  teach you, but I have to charge.”  Her  co-workers  move to  her music, 
swing their  hips  in a well-choreographed manner,  but  never come close to 
being like Kelis. They clearly do not possess her skills or command her power. 
There  is much  for  both  feminists  and  pro-sex  theorists  to  celebrate  in 
this video. Kelis is a woman  in charge  of her own sexuality.  She is using her 
sexual power and loving it. She is not a befuddled (nor even a faux befuddled)  
Marilyn  Monroe,  sheepishly smiling as some other  force - the wind from an 
air vent - blows her dress up around  her face (Wilder, 1955). Kelis  herself  is  
doing  all  the  blowing  and  sucking.  Unlike  Madonna’s 
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highly  successful 1984 video,  Like a Virgin (Madonna, 2009), sex in this 
video is not  good  because  it feels novel and  innocent,  it is good  because 
Kelis is so good at it. She is her own sexual agent, fully in charge of what she 
does. At least as long as the boys keep coming to her yard. 
But there may also be cause for concern. Kelis’ body parts are clearly 
abstracted from herself. It may feel like progress that  she, rather  than  some 
man,  is the  one  abstracting her  body  parts  from  herself,  but  sex for  her 
seems to be about  her breasts,  not  about  her. What  she appears  to love is 
the power  that  her sexual parts  bring.  It is power  over the men, who are 
falling all over themselves trying  to  see her,  but  just  as importantly, it is 
power  over  women.  Recall  that  it is the  women  to  whom  she is singing. 
Kelis uses her sexual agency to demonstrate how much more sexual power 
she has, relative to the other women. This is not a video depicting everyone 
luxuriating  in a culture without  sexual inhibition.  This is a video about  one 
person getting all the goods.
32 
And the reason  she is the one able to get all the 
men and all that  sex is because she has better  sexual assets than  do the other 
girls. 
In the spring of 2010, another  artist,  Ke$ha, released a video demonstrat- 
ing female  sexual  agency  in a  very different  way (Ke$ha,  2010). In  Blah, 
Blah, Blah, Ke$ha  sings to the men telling them what she wants - or more 
precisely - what she does not want,  sexually. Cavorting  around  a bar  with duct 
tape in hand, her most common demand is that the men stop talking. 
“Stop talking that blah, blah, blah,” Ke$ha croons. All the while, she’s spinning  
a roll of duct tape around  the mouth  and body of a man.  “Want to dance 
in the back with no pants?” she asks the camera.  “Then meet me with a jack 
by the juke box.”  She demonstrates the  power  of choice,  the ability  to  say 
no.  “Think  you’ll be getting this? At  which point,  she bares her cleavage to 
the camera.  “I don’t wanna be naked with you when you’re wasted.” 
Again, there is much to celebrate in this video. Ke$ha  is in charge. She 
understands what  she wants  sexually and  asks for it. She is clear in what she  
does  not  like.  Her  comfort  with  her  own  desire  and  her  ability  to express 
what  she does not  want  demonstrates a female sexual agency that many  
feminists  worked  hard  to  unleash.  Yet  it  is difficult  to  imagine  a more 
obvious rejection of feminist rape reformers’ justification  for presuming that  
sex without  evidence of consent  is rape.  The  baseline  of no  was rooted in a 
need to address women’s sexual passivity and socialized acquiescence. Ke$ha  
shows none of that.  Just as important, the baseline of no  was  meant  to  
encourage  communication because  sex without  it  was risky  and  
communication  was  considered  a  necessary  part  of  a  healthy, 
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mutual  sexual  experience.  The  duct  tape  soundly  rejects  that  idea.  Both 
videos celebrate sex for its own sake - free from intimacy and relationship. One 
gets the distinct impression that  for both the protagonists and the men involved, 
sex is just as queer theory and sex positivism would want it to be: pleasure-
seeking,  varied, edgy, and frequent.
33
 
Still, while women celebrating  their own sexuality may be a sign of pro- 
gress, but there is still a stark gender difference in what gets objectified and 
sexualized.  Women  and  women’s  body  parts   still  constitute   the  sexual 
prize, even if it is women taking charge of the sexual demonstration. As the 
American  Psychological  Association  has concluded,  “women  and  girls are 
more likely than  men and boys to be objectified and sexualized in a variety of 
media  outlets  (including  television,  magazines,  sports  media  and  music videos  
[and]  in  advertising”   (American  Psychological  Association,   2002, p.  14). 
Regardless  of whether  one  believes that  “difference  means  dominance” 
(MacKinnon, 1989a, p. 39), it is notable  how much difference there still is. 
Moreover,  the women who play the supporting roles in the videos suggest a 
dimmer  view of the sexual agency these videos depict.  They are left out of the 
celebration,  unable to charm the men, and leaving the viewer to wonder whether 
they are likely to get the sexual adulation of a Kelis and Ke$ha, or instead, be 
relegated to the chorus line. 
 
 
Hooking Up 
 
Ke$ha’s desire for sex without  verbal communication appears  to be one of 
the hallmarks  of hook-ups,  the predominant form of sexual activity on col- 
lege campuses  today.  Hooking   up  now  plays  the  role  once  played  by  a 
casual date (Garcia,  Reiber,  Massey, & Merriweather, 2012, pp. 161-162). 
Though   definitions  vary,  a  hook-up   is  generally  defined  as  “a  sexual 
encounter  (that  may  or  may  not  involve sexual intercourse)  between  two 
people who are brief acquaintances or strangers,  usually lasting one night 
without   the  expectation   of  developing  a  relationship”  (Paul  &  Hayes, 
“The causalities of casual sex: A qualitative  exploration of the phenomen- 
ology  of  college students’  hookups,” 2002, p.  640).34   Between  60%  and 
80% of North  American college students report  having some hook-up 
experience. (Garcia  et al., 2012, p. 163). One study found  that  on average, a 
college student  had 6.9 hook-ups  during  college and 28% of college students 
had 10 or more hook-ups  (England,  Shafer, & Fogarty, 2008, p. 533). Hook-
ups are usually initiated at social gatherings, are often fueled with alcohol,   and   
only  sometimes   lead  to   what   might   be  called  a  dating 
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relationship. For  the  most  part,  the  sexual  experience  proceeds  without 
much  verbal  communication about  what  is happening  (Bisson & Levine, 
2009; Paul, 2006, p. 146; Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 658).
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Again,  there  may  be much  to  celebrate  in this  now  dominant form  of 
young adult  sexual interaction. Young  people are free to experiment  sexually  
without   the  burdens   and   expectations   of  relationship   (Bradshaw, Kahn,  
& Saville, 2010).
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Particularly  in an age when college-going young people  need  
flexibility and  mobility  professionally,  being  able  to  explore sex without 
commitment  may be an essential growing experience. If relationships  require 
mutual  giving and one person’s occupational or personal desires are likely to 
conflict with another’s,  surely there will be people who would rather  not bother  
with that  conflict, yet still enjoy an active sex life. As Professors  Rosenbury 
and  Rothman (2010) pointed  out,  the  intimacy that was once thought  to be 
an essential component of a sexual relationship (Ayres & Baker, 2005; 
Rosenbury & Rothman, 2010) is all too often encapsulated  in pre-conceived  
notions  of relationship  that  “sustain  gender  and sexual hierarchies”  
(Armstrong, Hamilton, & England,  2010; Rosenbury & Rothman, 2010). 
Moreover,  many young women love sex qua sex, pure in and  of itself, without  
its baggage  (Dansky,  2000). They  believe, to  para- phrase  Glick (2000),
37  
in 
fucking  their  way to happiness  (Bullock-Jordan, 
2000, p. 232; Miya-Jervis, 2000, pp. 280-281).
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As with  sexting and  cultural  images, though,  there  may  be reason  for 
concern. A great deal of hook-up  culture is still deeply gendered. Consider, for 
example,  the extent  to which a hook-up  involves antiquated norms  of 
male/female  sexual interactions.  In a survey of 4,000 students  at five major 
colleges, one team of researchers found that although  women may start a 
conversation or ask a man  to dance,
39  
men are more  likely to do so, and 
men are much more likely to initiate the sexual interaction  (England  et al., 
2008, p. 535). Once the sexual interaction  is initiated, the gendered script 
continues.  The  same  study  found  that  44%  of  men  experienced  orgasm 
during  hook-ups   while  only  19%  of  women  did  (England  et  al.,  2008, p. 
535). Men  who  engage in intercourse  without  oral  sex had  an  orgasm 
70% of the time, while women who engaged in intercourse  without  oral sex had  
an  orgasm  only 34%  of the time (England  et al., 2008, p. 535). One obvious  
reason  for  this  disparity  is the  often  nonreciprocal nature  of the sexual 
activity. In 45% of cases involving oral sex without intercourse,  only men 
received the oral  sex. In 15%  of cases, only women received the oral sex 
(England et al., 2008, p. 536). 
Another  potential  reason  for the orgasm  gap is the noncommunicative 
nature  of the sexual activity.  Because the parties  do  not  talk  about  what 
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they  are  doing,  it may  be difficult for  them  to  know  each  other’s  wants, 
needs, and feelings. Indeed,  it appears  that  there is still a great deal of mis- 
communication.  In   cases  involving   cunnilingus,   women   report   having 
orgasms  25%  of the time, but  men report  their partners  achieving orgasm 
60%  of  the  time.  Miscommunication  between  partners   with  regard   to 
orgasm  is not  unique  to  the  hook-up  experience,  but  the  large  disparity 
suggests that  miscommunication is common  in hook-ups.  However  tanta- 
lizing the image of Ke$ha with her duct tape, silence appears  to have some 
information costs. 
The lack of mutuality may also be related to the absence of any future 
commitment. As one man explained,  “if it’s just a hook-up  … it’s more of a  
selfish thing”  (England  et al.,  2008, p.  538). Another  man  commented that  
if “it’s a one night thing, I don’t think  [the woman’s orgasm  is] gonna matter  
to  [men] that  much.”  Certainly,  orgasms  are  not  the  only  reason people  
participate  in  sexual  activity.  Sexual  activity  can  be  pleasurable without  
orgasm, of course, but the orgasm gap does indicate that  for many on  
contemporary college campuses  sex mainly  involves  women  servicing men. 
Another  nonmutual aspect  of hook-up  culture  pertains  to  the  reputa- 
tional  effects of sex, which are still very different  for men and  women.  In 
short,  women are called “sluts” far more readily than  men are called “man 
whores”  (Armstrong & Hamilton, 2009, p. 598). The idea that  men might be 
referred  to as “whores”  is probably  some indication  of emerging norms of 
gender  equality,
40  
but  both  women  and  men hold  women  to  a stricter 
standard of sexual propriety.
41 
When asked if they ever hooked up with 
someone who they think  respected them less because of the hook-up,  55% of 
the women,  but  only 21%  of the men said “yes” (England  et al., 2008, p. 
539). As one man said describing what he considered a positive hook-up, “I got 
oral sex without  putting  much effort forth.  It felt good but I’m glad I’m not  
going  out  with  someone  slutty  like that”  (Paul  & Hayes,  2002, p. 653).42 
If  aversion  to  sluttiness  helps  women  slow down,  the  esteem  of one’s 
peers  gives men  a  reason  to  speed  up.  As  it  has  been  for  some  time  - 
maybe  for all time - sex is a source of masculinity-enhancement for men 
(Baker, 1999, p. 673). Men get credit with their peers for “scoring”  (Ray & 
Rosow,  2010, p. 537). “Many  males defined good  hook-ups  as those  that 
earn you bragging rights, especially when the hook-up  partner  was … a tro- phy” 
(Paul, 2006, p. 146). Hook-ups, like other forms of “girl watching,” “work[] as a 
dramatic  performance  played to other men, a means by which a certain type 
of masculinity is produced  and heterosexual  desire displayed. 
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It is a means by which men assert masculine identity to other men” (Quinn, 
2002, p. 555). 
Contemporary  research  suggests  that  this  kind  of  competition  is not 
unique to men, however. Notwithstanding the reputational harms that  may 
come from too many hook-ups,  women compete  with each other  for good 
hook-ups.   Women  also  perceive  themselves  of  having  “won”  when  they 
“score” with a worthy hook-up  partner. Describing a “good”  hook-up,  one 
woman  said, “I was pretty  happy,  a little drunk,  enjoying the fact that  the 
hottest   guy  at  the  party   was  kissing  me.  I  felt  like  I  had  just  won  a 
game …” (Paul  & Hayes,  2002, p. 653). Another  woman  more  succinctly said, 
“I was so proud  of myself that  I finally got him; put  a notch  on my belt” 
(Bryant & Schofield, 2007, p. 334). 
Notably,  the same woman who wanted a notch on her belt reported  feel- 
ing terrible the next morning because her partner  had been married  and the 
encounter    was   not   “romantic”  (Bryant   &  Schofield,   2007,   p.   334). 
Although  some hook-ups  may be about  increasing  the number  of notches 
on the belt, part of what appears  to motivate women, as traditional notions of 
gender would suggest, is a desire for relationship. One of the hallmarks of a 
bad hook-up  for women is that  it did not lead to relationship  (Paul & Hayes, 
2002, p. 542). Younger men, in general, have less interest in relationships  and 
may see hook-ups  as a way of avoiding them (England  et al., 
2008, p. 542; Paul & Hayes, 2002, pp. 653 and 658).
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The  satisfaction  with “scoring”  for  women  may  also  have more  to  do 
with body image than  either sex or relationship.  When asked about  sensual 
pleasures,  girls repeatedly  describe instances in which they felt they looked 
good  (Hurtado & Sinha,  2005). As Orbach  (2008) puts  it,  “Bodies  have 
become personal  productions” (p. 227). Psychologist Deborah Tolman  ela- 
borated   on  this  concept  when  describing  girls’ self-objectification  to  the 
New York Times: 
 
By the time they are teenagers, the girls I talk to respond  to questions  about  how their 
bodies feel - questions  about  sexuality or desire - by talking  about  how their bodies look. 
They will say something  like, “I felt like I looked  good.”  Looking  good is not a feeling 
(Orenstein, 2010, p. MM11). 
 
Commercial  markets for beauty products  and body manipulations surely 
help women perfect their personal  productions. Despite a growing number 
of male consumers,  the cosmetic  enhancement  industry  - be it make-up, 
surgery or pubic hair removal - is overwhelmingly targeted  toward  female 
consumers  (Rhode,  2010, p.  30). Women  spend  far  more  annually  than 
men  do  on  “producing”  their  bodies  (Rhode,   2010,  p.  32).  This  cost 
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disparity surely is related to the fact that girls and women, much more than 
boys and men, self-objectify. “In self-objectification, girls internalize an observer’s 
perspective on their physical selves and learn to treat  themselves as objects  to 
be looked  at  and  evaluated  for their  appearance. Numerous studies   have  
documented  the  presence   of  self-objectifications   more   in women  than  
men”  (American  Psychological  Association,  2002, p.  2). As third wave 
feminists would emphasize, women choose to spend this money, and shape 
their bodies, but it is worth  stating  the obvious: physical perfection  is 
unattainable.  That  women  may  feel empowered  enough  to  self- objectify 
does not render the objectification  itself empowering or harmless. 
Indeed, one potential  casualty of this self-objectification is women’s rela- 
tionship  to  their  own sexuality.  With  so much  invested  in their  bodies  as 
objects,  for  some  young  women,  sex becomes  an  instrumental means  of 
proving  to oneself and others that  one looks good. Orbach  (2008) observes 
that  for young  women “sex is often a form  of production or an aspect of 
self that  is manufactured rather  than  integral  to self” (p. 224). “For  many 
young  women,  sex is to  be  experienced  from  the  outside  and  performa- 
tively, identity  enhanced  by the capacity  to view oneself as doing it as one is 
meant to” (Orbach,  2008, p. 225). 
Seen as such,  it is hard  to  see how  hook-ups  permit  women  to  “fuck 
their  way  to  freedom.”   Fucking   is  just  a  way  of  demonstrating that one 
looks good. In a retrospective commemorating the anniversary of psychologist   
Michelle   Fine’s   plea   that   women   and   girls  grow   more comfortable 
articulating their discourse of sexual desire, Fine wrote, “a dis- course  of desire 
is [now]  rampant, commodified,  and  being  sold.  Careful what you ask for …” 
(Fine, 2005, p. 57). 
Of deeper concern, perhaps,  is the indication  that the hyper-objectification 
of one’s own body may hamper  women’s ability to experience sexual desire and  
protect  themselves  from  sexual  activity  they  do  not  want.  As  one group 
of researchers explained, because sexual activity usually involves exposing one’s 
body and  making  it vulnerable  to evaluation,  women who are intensely 
concerned with making sure their body looks perfect may be reticent to disrupt  
the physical act, even if the act is undesired, unprotected and/or  painful 
(Impett,  Schooler, & Tolman,  2006, p. 131). If sex is performance and the goal 
of performance  is to make one’s body look good, one may  not  want  to  break  
up  the  performance:  Saying  no  can  make  one’s body look bad. 
Finally,  it is important to note that  women regret hooking-up far more 
often than  do men.
44   
Although  researchers  are careful to qualify their find- 
ings with a recognition  that  psychologically distressed women may be more 
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likely  to  hook-up,   studies  repeatedly  confirm  the  regret  gap  (Fielder  & 
Carey, 2005; Owen & Fincham,  2010; Owen et al., 2010).
45  “[S]ome women 
may have experienced positive emotions  during  the sexual encounter  (feeling 
chosen, noticed,  attractive),  [but] they are more likely to feel ashamed and  
regretful  after”  (Paul  & Hayes,  2002, p. 656). Paul  and  Hayes  (2002) concluded  
that  “[t]he dominant notion  of regret  for  females centered  on shame and  
self-blame for engaging in sexual behaviors  in the context  of a hook-up  …. 
The dominant notion of regret for males centered on disappointment  over  a  
bad  choice  of  hook-up   partner” (p.  655).46   Women’s regret may reflect 
more than  just disappointment. One study of hooking  up during the first two 
months  of college showed that women were more likely than  men to experience 
unwanted  sexual penetration (Katz,  Tirone,  & van der Kloet, 2012). 
That  women feel shame and self-blame suggests that  women hold them- 
selves accountable  for  what  happened.  They  believe in their  own  agency 
and  wish they had  said no to the sex. But consider  how little agency they 
seem to have in their own accounts of the hook-up: 
 
It was going to happen whether I wanted it or not. (Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 654). 
 
I was trapped  at a party. I wanted to get out of there. (Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 654). 
 
I wouldn’t say no, but I wouldn’t say yes either, so I was passive and he’s kind of a for- 
ceful guy. (Bay-Cheng & Eliseo-Arras,  2008, p. 394). 
 
He just mauled  me in my drunken  stupor.  I wanted  to cry and  throw  up.  I felt used 
(Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 654). 
 
I was wasted.  He  took  advantage. I felt horrible  and  used and  experienced  pain  for 
days (Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 654). 
 
If these women took  seriously the baseline of no consent,  believing that sex  
without   consent  should   be  presumptively   illegal,  they  would  have described  
these  experiences  as  rape.  None  of  them  did.  In  her  study  of 
27 young  women who had  sexual experiences that  involved force or coer- 
cion, Phillips (2000) found that 25 of them (95%), refused to label their 
experience as abuse  or victimization  (p. 196). Indeed,  when one of Paul’s 
(2006) subjects was asked whether she held anyone other than herself 
accountable  she said no because “when you blame it on the other person, it 
sounds  rapish”  (p. 148). Women do not want to be raped,  and by blaming 
themselves instead of the men who “maul”  or “take advantage,” they don’t 
have to be raped. 
Thus,  like  most  modern  sexual  practices,  hook-up   culture  presents  a 
mix of new and  old. Although  it provides  both  men and  women many  of 
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the freedoms that  queer and pro-sex theory seem to prize (e.g., the opportu- 
nity to experiment  sexually without  intimacy or relationship, the opening of 
“possibilities … and permissions  for pleasure,”  Vance, 1993, and the chance to 
have a great deal of sex), it also brings with it a distinctly transactional 
understanding of sex, one that  can play out  with the actors  in traditionally 
gendered roles. The overwhelmingly gendered script of the hook-up, and 
particularly  the  passive  norms  governing  female  initiation,   suggest  that, 
although   many  perceive  themselves  as  choosing  their  course  of  conduct 
when hooking  up, the reality is that  something  else, if not  someone  else, is 
controlling  much of what they do. Men initiate the sex; they get more sexual 
satisfaction  out  of it and  they  are  much  less likely to  regret  it afterward. Sex 
in these encounters  may  not  be something  that  men  do  to  women  to assert 
dominance  over them, but that  does not mean that  the benefits of the encounter  
are mutual and correlative. 
For  the  law,  though,   the  important question  is not  whether  a  given 
sexual  encounter  was  mutually  beneficial.  Instead,  the  central  inquiry  is 
whether  a jury should  be permitted  to  convict  for rape  in the absence  of 
evidence showing both that  parties consented  to have sex. It is to this ques- 
tion that we turn in our final section. 
 
 
 
MAPPING THE THEORY ONTO  REALITY 
 
In  the  section  “Modern Rape  Reform,”   we saw  how  rape  law  reform’s 
embrace  of a baseline of no was rooted  both  in a perceived need to over- 
come sexual scripts that  dictate  women’s passivity and  also in a perceived 
need to encourage  communication as a means to assuring a more mutually 
enriching  sexual experience. In the section  “Sex Narratives,” we saw how such 
a baseline was justified by the second wave feminist accounts of how sexuality 
functioned  in people’s lives, but was more suspect in a sex positivist  world  in  
which  eroticism  is a  primary,  liberty-enhancing  force  that must not be over 
regulated. 
The section “Contemporary Sexual Norms and Practice’s” analysis of 
contemporary sexual  culture  shows  that  neither  theory  gets reality  right, but  
neither  theory  gets it all wrong  either.  Feminists  are  both  right  and wrong 
that women lack agency. The nonconsensual expropriation of sex by men from 
women still seems commonplace, but the injury it causes women does  not  
seem like spiritual  murder.  Indeed,  most  of the  women  studied reject 
classifying it as injurious. 
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It is also clear that  despite the normative  slant implicit in the baseline of no 
consent,
47  
sexual norms have not realigned in support  of a communicative, 
mutually-pleasurable sexuality.  At  the  same  time,  our  evaluation  of young  
women’s  experiences  of  contemporary  casual  sexual  interactions reveals few 
of the benefits that  pro-sex and queer theorists  argued underlay sex qua  sex. 
Indeed,  much of the sex that  does occur is simply unwanted, whether  
consented  to or not.  The discussion  below fleshes out  these para- doxes as 
they pertain  to the contemporary understandings of agency, injury and sex itself 
in young people’s lives. 
 
 
Agency 
 
Our  analysis  suggests that  there  are many  reasons  to  believe that  women 
are,  as MacKinnon said,  “socialized  into  passive receptivity  … submit  to 
survive.”  First,  women are far less likely to start  a sexual interaction  that they 
do want. Second, no one verbally communicates  much of anything,  or at  least  
anything  not  dictated  by  the  accepted  script,  during  a  hook-up. This may 
reflect an erotic desire to dispense with conversation, but  it may just as easily 
reflect social conventions  that  have nothing  to do with desire. Third,  women 
are far more likely to provide pleasure to men than  to ask a man to provide 
pleasure to them. Perhaps  women prefer giving to receiving oral sex, but if 
there is gendered disparity  in desire as well as gendered dis- parity in 
performance,  perhaps we should remain skeptical, as feminists suggested we 
should, about  the origins of desire. 
There are many  reasons  to believe that  women feel themselves empow- 
ered to say no, though.  Clearly, Ke$ha and Kelis portray  images of women 
being able to ask for and get what they like. Girls and women are sexting, 
many without explicit pressure from boys. To some, this practice represents a 
disquieting  commodification  of one’s body  parts,  but  it also  represents 
agency. Whether  they are doing  so because men want  them to or because 
they want to showcase themselves, women are pushing  the send button. In 
their  study  of  college  students’  unwanted   sexual  experiences,  Professors 
Bay-Cheng  and  Eliseo-Arras  (2008) observe  that  “conventional prescrip- 
tions for a passive and pleasing female sexuality operate  alongside simulta- 
neous  - and  seemingly oppositional - expectations  that  women  portray 
themselves  as  wantonly   and  flagrantly  sexual  (p.  386).  Through   main- 
streaming of “raunch  culture,”  women and even young girls are encouraged to  
perform  and  act  out  sexual  personae  previously  reserved  for  women porn  
stars  and  prostitutes” (Bay-Cheng  & Eliseo-Arras,  2008, p.  389).48 
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Women  are encouraged  to demonstrate the sexual agency once forbidden 
them under more traditional notions  of femininity. 
The pervasiveness of raunch  culture  is likely to affect both  the partici- 
pants in unwanted  or nonconsensual sex and the jurors who might sit in 
judgment  of it. If ubiquitous cultural  messages suggest that  women are in 
charge of their own sexuality and sexual exchanges, why should  we expect 
jurors  to believe that  women claiming rape really lay there passively? And 
indeed,  why should  the  women  themselves  believe it? If women  grow  up 
with an expectation  that  they will be powerful sexual actors,  they will resist 
accounts that describe them as passive. 
Bay-Cheng  and  Eliseo-Arras   (2008)  also  found  that  the  “neoliberal” 
rhetoric  of “self-determination and  personal  responsibility  … lead women to  
blame  themselves”  for  unwanted  sex (p.  389). Consider  this  woman’s account 
of unwanted  sex: 
 
There’s nothing that I’ve done that has been against my will. Maybe things I didn’t necessarily 
want to do, but I mean I wasn’t pushed into these experiences. I mean, there were reasons  
these guys were led to  believe I would  do  those  things.  (Bay-Cheng  & Eliseo-Arras,  2008, 
p. 389) 
 
This woman  did sexual things she did not want to do. The men inaccu- 
rately assessed her sexual desires. She did not correct the men’s mispercep- 
tions. She did not stop what was happening.  But she believes that she could 
have.  Because  she  believes she  could  have  stopped  them,  she  does  not 
blame   the   men.   If  potential   victims  blame   themselves,   not   men   for 
unwanted  sexual experiences, it is extraordinarily unlikely that  the law will be 
able to blame men. Women’s belief in their  own agency will inevitably 
undermine  a criminal proscription rooted  in an understanding of women as 
conditioned  for passivity. 
 
 
 
Injury 
 
As discussed in the section  “Sex Narratives,” the extent  to which the law 
needs to police nonconsensual sex depends, in large part,  on how bad non- 
consensual sex is. West (2010) describes the different feminist and queer 
theoretic views of the rape injury this way: 
 
Queers, like feminists, blur the distinction  between consent and nonconsent, the former to 
say, it’s all a little consensual  so it’s okay, the latter to say it’s all a little nonconsensual so 
it’s not okay (p. 231). 
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West  (2010) warns,  though,  that  just  because  “some  undesired  sex is 
harmless hardly  means that  it all is” (p. 238). West is indisputably  right on this  
point,   but  the  hook-up   literature   repeatedly  involves  narratives   in which 
unconsented  to sex was not  experienced as that  bad.  It was unpleasant.  It  
often  hurt.   It  often  made  the  women  feel  ashamed.   But  fully consensual 
sex can be experienced, and often is experienced, in precisely the same way. 
That women do not seem to experience terror or much pain in some 
nonconsensual  sex  may  mean  that   West  was  just  wrong  in  her  earlier 
account  of what distinguishes  rape from  unwanted  but  consensual  sex. Or it 
could  mean  that  women’s sense of their  own agency and  their  belief in their   
control   over   their   own   bodies   actually   diminishes   their   injury. Perhaps  
the spirit is not murdered  if women interpret  their decision not to fight back,  
to  get it over with, to  let it happen,  as a kind  of control  that keeps their 
souls intact. Women use their sense of their own agency to construct  away  
their  injury.  They  do  not  want  to  be raped,  so they  are  not raped. 
Legally, then, one might say that  because the injury from nonconsensual sex 
is not  that  bad,  the baseline should  not  be no.  We needn’t over-deter sex  
to  protect   the  vulnerable  because  the  vulnerable  are  not  hurt  very much.  
Further, one  could  argue  that  contemporary  norms  surrounding casual 
sexual encounters  inevitably will lead to some mistaken  assumptions of consent,  
but  that  these mistakes,  even if they result in unwanted  inter- course, are not 
sufficiently injurious  to women that  the law should  classify them as sex crimes.
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On the other hand,  the baseline of no is not likely to deter much of any- 
thing  if women  consistently  construct  away  their  injury.  Women  who  do not 
feel raped do not bring rape charges. No man has to worry about  being charged 
with rape by such a woman,  because a woman who does not want to consider 
herself, or have others view her as, a rape victim, does not go to the police. It 
does not matter  what the baseline is if no one is a victim. 
There may be some women, though,  who feel much more injured. When 
“mauled”  or “taken  advantage  of,” some women feel powerless. They feel 
they cannot  escape; they feel like their soul is being shattered.  These women 
may identify themselves as having been raped and they may bring charges. 
How can a potential  rape defendant  know whether his sex partner  is the 
kind  of person  who will be hurt  and  name  that  injury  as rape? Catharine 
MacKinnon  wrote  that   women  had  a  hard   time  telling  the  difference 
between rape  and  sex, but  perhaps  it is not  just women who have a hard 
time.  If  two  women  might  experience,  or  interpret,   the  same  kind  of 
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interaction   so  differently,  one  feeling  like  it  was  sex  she  should   have 
avoided  by saying no,  and  the other  feeling like she was raped,  how is a 
man supposed to know when he will cross the line into illegality? 
One  obvious,  yet surprisingly  controversial, answer  is that  men  might 
simply  ask.
50  
Pro-sex  and  queer  theorists  suggest  that  “just  asking,”  in 
addition  to  regulating  a core  area  of personal  liberty,  may  well “kill the heat 
that  draws us toward  our  desires” (Franke,  2001). To these theorists, accepting 
the baseline of no in the name of protecting  the women who feel deeply injured 
by nonconsensual sex stifles too much excitement. If the empirical  work  
suggested  that   contemporary  sexual  encounters   among young people 
generated anything like the transgressive, heterogeneous, liberating  sexuality  that  
pro-sex  and  queer  theorists  celebrate,  we might find this argument  more 
convincing. That  is, if power in hook-up  relation- ships  manifested  itself  
episodically,  not  structurally
51   
and  if  the  danger women exposed themselves 
to seemed even remotely related to whatever pleasure  they  receive,  the  costs  
of  the  baseline  of  no  might  seem  more real to  us. Given  the  reality  of 
contemporary sexual  culture,  the  dangers from over-regulating  and even 
punishing  ambiguously  consensual  sex seem minimal. 
 
 
Sex 
 
Our  analysis of contemporary culture  suggests that  feminists have largely 
failed in their attempt to prescribe a more communicative mutual sexual 
experience. Pro-sex and queer theorists may decry any attempt  to inscribe a 
normative  view of sexuality, but,  at least as pertains  to young people, they 
need not  be particularly  worried  about  the normative  vision embedded  in 
the baseline of no because that  normative  vision is altogether  absent  from 
hook-up  culture.  Yet  the  feminist  communicative  ideal has  not  been  dis- 
placed  by  the  sex positivists’  ideal  of  more  passionate,   edgy,  erotic  sex. 
Hook-ups are  hardly  that.  They  are  minimally  satisfying  sexual  transac- 
tions  in which both  sides often engage for reasons  tangential  to the desire for 
sex itself. Apparently, men get more pleasure out of casual sexual encounters  
than  do women, but both  men and women are using the sex for reasons 
surprisingly distinct from erotic pleasure. They are using it to accumulate  points  
in different,  though  possibly complementary games. Women are using sex to 
showcase their bodies. Some women are using sex to find relationship, even 
though  hook-ups  are defined as sex without  relationship. Men  are  using  sex  
to  achieve  masculinity   points.   Men  frequently   use 
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hook-ups  to “get”  orgasms,  but  even those  hardly  seem like the transcen- 
dent events celebrated by sex positivists. 
These varying motives for sex, many of which are probably  not that  well 
understood by the young people acting on them, may explain why so very 
much unwanted  sex happens.  During  one two-week period studied by Bay- 
Cheng and Eliseo-Arras  (2008), 50% of college women and 26% of college men 
said they engaged in unwanted  coitus (p. 386). These statistics  suggest yet 
another  gender  disparity  with  regard  to  unwanted  sex, but  they  also show 
an alarmingly high rate of unwanted  sex by both women and men. 
If, by retaining  the baseline of no, the law is even mildly deterring  this 
unwanted  - even if consensual  - sex, we think  it  is doing  some  good. 
Hook-up culture, in which both men and women acquiesce to so much 
unwanted  sex, creates  its own  kind  of hedonic  risks.  If repeated  acquies- 
cence to unwanted  sex alienates women from their own felt sexual desires, 
then  the risk of over-deterring  consensual  but  unwanted  sex emerges as a 
hedonic good - a pro-sex policy, if you will. 
At the very least, the frequency  with which women engage in unwanted sex 
suggests that  there are reasons  beyond  second wave feminism’s conflation of 
sex and rape that  validate deterring  encounters  in which consent  is ambiguous.  
It is not  that  what  the man  has done  in proceeding  with con- sensually 
ambiguous  sex is so contemptible. It is that the objectification, competition    and   
gender   dynamics   that   explain   why   women   endure unwanted  sex are so 
powerful that  they overshadow,  if not completely dis- place, pleasure and 
eroticism. The resulting injury may be less immediately intense than rape, but 
just as problematic (Phillips, 2000, p. 192).
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Contemporary sexual  practices  among  young  people  hardly  reveal  the 
erotic  nirvana   that   sex  positive  and  queer  theorists   might  have  hoped 
would emerge once we dispensed with all the baggage that intimacy and 
relationship  are supposed  to bring. Contemporary sexual norms  clearly do 
not  create  a world  in which  sexual  self-expression  and  lived desire bring 
forth sexual self-actualization and joy. A baseline of no may over-deter  sex, but 
if sex is as the studies of hook-up  culture suggest, it is not clear why we need to 
be concerned with over-deterring  it. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
According  to the organizations that  keep such statistics, nonconsensual sex 
and sexual assault  is commonplace. The Guttmacher Institute  reports  that 
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11% of women aged 18-24 who had sex before age 20 said that it was 
“unwanted” (Guttmacher Institute,  2013). The Department of Education 
reports  that  one in five women  on college campuses  are victims of sexual 
assault  (Sieben, 2001). Data  from  the  United  Kingdom  suggest the  exact 
same  percentage   (Orbach,   2008,  p.  220).  In  one  study  of  high  school 
students, 80% of the girls had experienced sexual harassment, defined as 
unwanted   sexual   overtures   and   comments   (Tolman,   Spencer,   Rosen- 
Reynoso,  & Porche, 2003, p. 162).
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The rape reform  movement  attempted to reduce some of these numbers 
by instituting  a baseline of no, trying to ensure men secured consent before 
proceeding  with sex. The  perceived need for  a default  of no  grew out  of 
norms  that   encouraged   women’s  passivity,  discouraged   communication, 
and  rewarded  men  but  not  women  for  sexual  conquest.  Many  of  those 
norms  have changed.  Women are no longer perceived as or perceive them- 
selves as passive sexual victims, though  women still act passively. Women 
embrace their own objectification.  Both men and women use sex as a form of 
conquest,  or at least as an opportunity to gain points in a game that  has little 
to do with the sex itself. Everyone resists attempts  to force communication 
during sex. 
Although much of the original justification for the baseline of no has 
disappeared, our  examination of contemporary sexual norms  and  realities 
makes  it  hard  to  see how  the  baseline  of  no  does  any  harm.  Women’s 
embrace  of their  own  agency seems to  diminish  their  immediate  sense of 
having  been  raped,  and  with  it  the  likelihood  that  they  will bring  rape 
charges.  Men  will not  be deprived  of the sex they want  if they know  the 
women  with  whom  they  have  sex will not  bring  rape  charges.  The  rare 
woman  who does feel injured  might bring charges, but  it seems likely that 
jurors,   exposed   to   the  ubiquitous  cultural   images  of  women’s  sexual 
agency,  will  hold  the  accusing  woman  to  the  same  standard to  which 
women hold themselves. She could have said no, and because women por- 
tray themselves as having agency, there is no excuse for her not saying no, 
even if the law says that  she does not  have to. To the extent a man is still 
concerned about  ambiguous  consent, he can just ask. 
To be sure, leaving in place a baseline of no consent raises the stakes for 
those who would rather  proceed on the assumption of consent than  have a 
potentially  awkward  conversation about  consent.  As such, the baseline of no 
consent may deter some sex. But the reality of young people’s sexual practices  
raises doubts  about  why anyone  should  be too  concerned  about such 
deterrence. A significant amount  of consensually ambiguous  sex is unwanted.  
That  unwanted  sex, even if not soul-murder, may cause its own 
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kind of harm.  The sheer prevalence of unwanted  sex makes us comfortable 
in concluding  that  the baseline of no does minimal  harm.  Neither  women 
nor  men,  at  least  on  college campuses,  seem much  enhanced  by the  vast 
majority  of casual sexual activity in which they participate. Sex is there in 
abundance, but  none  of the studies  of young  peoples’ sexual lives suggest that 
people are fucking their way to anything  like freedom. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  See, for example, California  Jury  Instructions - Criminal.  CALJIC  1.23.1. 
“Consent”   - Defined   in   Rape,    Sodomy,    Unlawful    Penetration   and   Oral 
Copulation. (“In [prosecutions  under] Penal Code section, the word ‘consent’ means 
positive  cooperation in an  act  or  attitude  as an  exercise of free will. The  person 
must  act  freely and  voluntarily  and  have  knowledge  of the  nature  of  the  act  or 
transaction involved.”) 
2.  We use the term  “second  wave” here only for the sake of convenience - to 
reference the era of feminists who, between approximately 1970 and 1990, called 
attention to the institutional bias against  women and  worked  to set an agenda  for 
law reform  in fields such as workplace  rights,  family law and,  as noted  herein  in, 
criminal law. Scholars  have aptly  noted  the inaccuracy  of the label “second  wave” for 
the generation  of feminists whose work  was inspired  by the civil rights  movement of 
the 1960s. The monikers  “second”  and  more recently “third”  wave feminism  are  
problematic, as  they  highlight  primarily  the  activism  of  white  feminists working for 
expanded  civil and political and gender rights, and erase equally important  movements  
of other  feminists, such as slave women who engineered  rebellion against race violence 
and slavery (Harris,  1990, p. 584). 
3.  While sex positivism  and  queer  theory  can be distinguished  at  many  levels, 
there  is substantial  overlap  between  the  two  bodies  of thought,  particularly  with 
regard to the way they contrast  with feminism’s accounts  of sexuality. For purposes of 
this paper, we treat sex positivism and queer theory as overlapping  ideologies. 
4.  Our claims and concerns in this paper  pertain  only to contemporary hetero- 
sexual experiences and the law of rape. All of the studies we cite and the norms we 
analyze  reflect  how  sexual  practices  usually  play  out  between  young  men  and 
women.  Norms  and  practices  and  the relationship  of the law to those  norms  and 
practices may be very different  for same sex couples, and indeed, very different  for gay 
men than  lesbians. We offer no analysis and make no claims as to how the law relates  
to  contemporary same sex sexual  practices.  We invoke  and  analyze  queer 
theory  not  because of what  it says about  same-sex sex, but  because of its implica- 
tions for heterosexual  sex. 
5.  According  to a National College Women Sexual Victimization  Study, jointly 
sponsored  by  NIJ  and  Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics,  about  one-third  of  all  rape/ 
sexual assaults are reported  to the police, and only about  one-half of those reported 
are cleared  by an arrest,  and  many  arrests  do not  result  in convictions.  (Dressler, 
2009,  p.   388).   Contemporary  research   suggests   that,   once   reported    to   law 
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enforcement  officials, rape  cases do  not  have  a  significantly  higher  attrition rate than  
do aggravated  assaults (citing a Department of Justice study on rape prosecution) 
(Dressler,  2009, p. 388). The lingering puzzle, then,  is why women hesitate  to report  
rape in the first place. Current  thinking  blames the underreporting problem on the 
“re-traumatization” experienced by victims at the hands  of the legal system. (Szczesniak, 
2004, p. 243). 
6.  The  standard feminist  response  to  this  insight  is that  women’s embrace  of 
their own objectification shows the awesome, comprehensive power of patriarchy: Women 
are taught  to crave their own subordination through  the eroticization  of objectification.  
“Only”  25 years have passed  since MacKinnon wrote  her ground- 
breaking  work on sexuality, and 25 years is but  a blink of an eye in the history  of 
patriarchy. A counter-argument is possible,  though,  and  practically-speaking, it is 
necessary: 25 years may be enough time for women to evaluate their terms of sexual 
engagement,  and  to dismiss as stale claims of false consciousness  about  their  bar- 
gain with pleasure.  Unlike  statutory rape,  in which the law presumes  the victim is too 
young to provide meaningful consent, non-consent  rape laws outlaw sexual encounters  
that  adult women consider acceptable.  This may simply be an untenable 
position  for criminal law. Adult  women must perceive themselves as victims before 
anyone can expect the law to punish the men who engage in nonconsensual sex. 
7.  Bownmiller  (1975) contributed the  most  theoretically,  as  the  champion   of 
the  idea  that  rape  is a  crime  of  violence  not  of  sex. A  decade  later,  Catharine 
MacKinnon went  on  to  critique  that  idea,  suggesting  that  it because  rape  was a 
crime of sex it was a crime involving subordination, power and violence. 
8.  See, for example, People v. Dorsey, 104 Misc 2
nd  
963, 429 NYS2d 828 (1980), 
aff’d, 89 A.D  2d 521, 452 NYS2d  210 (1982) (involving a 49-year-old,  5’ tall, 130 
pound  woman in an elevator with a 15-year old, weighing 200 pounds,  who stopped the 
elevator between floors). 
9.  Comprehensive  studies of all the different kinds of rape victims are very diffi- cult 
to find. Some reports  suggest that  women suffer as badly when raped violently 
by someone to whom they are very close (a spouse) as when they are raped violently 
by a stranger  (Bergen, 2005; Finkelhor & Yllo¨  , 1985). And some victims of acquain- 
tance rapes may be very badly injured psychologically (Anderson,  2005, p. 1401) 
(describing    acquaintance   rape    victims   “flashbacks    and    acute    psychological 
distress”). 
10.  Most  everyone agrees that  it is easier to condemn  the stranger  rapist  with a 
weapon than the date rapists. Indeed, as Susan Estrich (1992) concisely put it, much of 
the problem  with prosecuting  acquaintance rape  stems from  the fact that  “it is easier 
to condemn date rape, than the date rapist”  (pp. 32-33). 
11.  State in Interest of M.T.S. (1992). 
12.  One scholar,  I. Capers  (2011), claims that  there  have been no prosecutions 
based on the MTS standard baseline of no (p. 1305). It is difficult to accept this pro- 
position  in the absence of empirical evidence regarding  the nature  of rape claims filed 
by prosecutors. The absence of reported,  appellate  cases using the MTS stan- 
dard  in no way proves that  the standard is not being used at the charging, pleading 
and trial level. 
13.  In Wisconsin Statutes  (2007), the crime is defined as sexual intercourse  with a 
person without  the consent of that  person,  with consent being defined as “words or 
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overt  actions  by a person  who is competent  to give informed  consent  indicating  a 
freely  given  agreement  …”  (sec. 940.225(5)).  In  Florida   Statutes  (2007), rape  is 
defined as sex without  “intelligent, knowing and voluntary  consent”  (sec. 794.011(5)). In 
Washington Revised Code Annotated (2008), the consent is defined to mean “that at the 
time of the act of sexual intercourse  or sexual contact  there are actual words or conduct 
indicating feely given agreement to have sexual intercourse  or sexual contact” (sec. 
9A.44.010(7)). 
14.  See, for  instance,  one  commentator to  a  story  on  hook-ups  in  The  Daily 
Beast. “Who wants fair sex? Boring repressed people” (Siligson, 2009). Mohr  (1988) 
writes  “sex  withdraws  one  form  the  world  of  waking  and  talking,  from  reason 
persuasion  and  thought.  Sex is essentially a world  of silence; words,  such as they are, 
are not reports,  descriptions  or arguments,  but murmurs  and invocations  which 
emphasize silence and its awe” (p. 101). 
For  more elaborate  discussions  of queer and  pro-sex cultures  celebration  of sex 
that  seems  to  embody  something  very  different  than  the  second  wave  feminist 
vision, see Spindelman  (2011) (book review of Tim Dean, Unlimited  Intimacy: 
Reflections on the Subculture  of Barebacking)  (analyzing  culture  and thrill of men 
who have unprotected sex in order  to become infected)  (passim);  Kennedy  (2001) 
(“For  the Libertine,  sex on your knees, sex which is not reciprocated, sex by your- self, 
by yourself with another  person,  sex in a dog collar, sex when the parties  are not  
equal  in status  and  wealth  and  salary  and  job grade  and  beauty  and  age and 
height can also be sex.”) (p. 289). 
15.  Elaborating on all the reasons  women say yes to sex that  they do not  want, 
West  (2005)  explains  that  women  say  yes  because  otherwise  “he  will be  in  an 
unbearable snit the next day, or he will be abusive to the children  …[or he will be] 
physically abusive  to me, or humiliate  me, or embarrass  me. I consent  because,  if I 
don’t, I’ll lose status at the high school, or I won’t be liked, or I won’t like myself. This 
kind of sex happens  because my friends expect it to and will think less of me if 
it doesn’t” (p. 448). 
16.  Note that West is careful to point out that the fear and pain she describes are 
not present with consensual s/m or unwanted  but consensual sex. 
17.  This is Janet  Halley’s characterization of West’s claims about  the injury  of 
rape. 
18.  One of the reasons, West (1993) suggests, that we do not condemn consensual 
but  unwanted  sex has to do with the commodification of sex. MacKinnon empha- 
sized the way that  patriarchy commodifies women, West criticized how our culture 
commodifies  sex itself.  Once  something  becomes  a  commodity,  bargaining  for  it 
makes  sense. Sex is just another  good  a resource-rich  man  can get from  someone 
with fewer resources. “The self that commodifies is the self that trades,  gives, or dis- 
poses and then benefits accordingly. That which is traded,  given, disposed of or sold 
must  be separated  from  the  self who  trades.  By contrast  when we “have  sex” or 
make  love, we do not  hold  our  “self” back  in this way …. Ideally  - and  it is an ideal 
worth holding on to - the self is given with the giving of sex” (p. 1451). 
19.  Halley  (2006)  writes  of  Robin   West,  “she  knows  the  difference  between 
morally  good  and  morally  bad  sex. Virtuous  sexuality  is feminist  sexuality  and  it has  
a decidedly  infantile,  lesbian  and  caring  shape  …. [Her] redemptive  sexuality deletes 
the possibly vital and  life-affirming dimensions  of men’s bodily immediacy, 
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phallic drive and aggression. It’s virtually a mandate  to men who want to sleep with 
feminists: Become lesbians” (pp. 64-66). 
20.  West (2005) has since gone to even greater lengths to distinguish between sex- 
ual encounters  marked  by desired  subordination and  hierarchy  and  undesired  sex 
that   involves  (and  probably   happens   because  of)  subordination  and  hierarchy. 
Some women clearly desire hierarchic sex, but that does not mean that all hierarchic 
sex is desired (p. 456). 
21.  As Eichner (2001) has argued, postmodernists have had a tendency to assume 
that  the heterogeneity  and multiplicity  of sexual desires that  they value can be rea- 
lized simply by pronouncing their existence (“postmodern strivings for heterogene- 
ity, multiplicity  and  difference …[are]… ends to be achieved through  political  and 
legal work, rather  than  as goals that  can be reached through  simple theoretical  pro- 
nouncements”) (p. 77). Foucault (1988) himself recognized that despite the potential 
for   deviant   disruption,  sexuality   is   often   normalized    (passim).   The   section 
“Contemporary Sexual Norms  and Practice”  certainly suggests the normalization of vast 
amounts  of sexual desire and behavior among young people. 
22. Professor  Eichner (2009) has cogently pointed  out that  this untempered 
valorization   of  sex in  queer  theory  exists  in  considerable  tension  between  queer 
theory’s  embrace  of poststructuralism. Presumably,  poststructuralism would  teach us  
that  sexuality,  like  power,  is socially  constructed, not  natural   or  innate  and therefore   
not  inherently   liberating.   “Taking   the  poststructuralist  conception   of 
power   seriously,   sexual   activity   is  not   appropriately  valenced   as  intrinsically 
positive,  as  many  queer  theorists  would  have  it,  just  as  it  is not  as  negative  as 
dominance  feminists portrayed it” (p. 317). Elaborating somewhat,  Eichner  (2009) 
goes one “As Foucault recognizes, power forms subject in a way that can make sub- 
jection feel good …. A politics that strives for freedom and self-determination accordingly  
needs  a  more  nuanced  set  of  precepts  than  ‘if it  feels good  do  it’” (p. 317). 
23.  Thus,  it would be inappropriate to equate  Rosenbury and  Rothman’s  disre- 
gard  of motive with Halley’s (2005) more encompassing  critique  that  by “framing, 
claiming and blaming”  sexual injuries for so much,  feminists generated  harms  that did 
not exist before the feminists claimed them (pp. 83-84). 
24.  “Third-wave  feminists embrace  make-up,  feminine styles of dress and  tradi- 
tional “girlie” behaviors.  If the second wave’s famous slogan, “the personal is politi- cal,” 
turned  every personal  grooming  decision into a political one, then third-wave feminists 
have made no decision political” (Crawford,  2007, p. 120). 
25.  See also (Day, 2010, pp. 73-74). Most sexters shared his or her naked picture 
with a romantic  interest.  And  they intend  for the photo  be for the recipient’s eyes 
only,  but  twenty  percent  of  sext recipients  pass  the  photos  along  to  unintended 
viewers (Day, 2010, pp. 73-74). Id. Indeed,  a study by The National Campaign  to 
Prevent  Teen  and  Unplanned Pregnancy  (2008) found  that  38%  of teen  girls and 
39% of teen boys reporting  having had sexually suggestive text messages or e-mails - 
originally meant for someone else - shared with them (p. 3). 
26.  Fifty-one  percent of teen girls say pressure from a guy is the reason girls send sexy 
messages or images; only 18%  of teen boys say pressure  from girls motivates boys   to   
send  such   messages.  The   National  Campaign   to   Prevent   Teen   and Unplanned 
Pregnancy,  Sex and  Tech: Results  from  a Survey of Teens and  Young 
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Adults,      4.     (2010),     http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/pdf/sextech_ 
summary.pdf 
27.  Seethe September,  2009 story  of 13-year-old  Hope  Witsell from  Saundance, 
Florida,  who  committed  suicide after  someone  intercepted  a topless  photo  of her 
that  she had  meant  to send to a boy in hopes  of getting  his attention earlier that 
year. Not  only was her photo  shared  with her schoolmates,  but  also with students 
at a nearby  high school. Hope’s schoolmates  surrounded her, hurling  taunting  and 
vulgar  remarks  like “whore”  and  “slut”  at  her.  See also  the  July,  2008 story  of 
18-year-old  Jesse Logan  from  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  who committed  suicide when her ex-
boyfriend,  following  their  break-up, sent  nude  pictures  of Jesse to  other  girls. 
These were pictures that Jesse had sent to her boyfriend when they were dating. The 
girls  harassed   Jesse,  calling  her  a  slut  and   a  whore.   She  was  miserable  and 
depressed, afraid even to go to school. Ultimately,  Jesse committed  suicide. 
28.  Sex positivists often criticize the condemnation of promiscuity  or any public 
display of sexuality (Rubin,  1984) (listing promiscuity  and  having  sex in public as 
markers  of what normalizing  influences have determined  to be “bad sex”); (Warner, 
1999) (listing “public”  as a marker  of impermissible  sex). Not  much  noted  by sex 
positivists is how the embrace of public sexuality calls into question the need for the 
rape shield laws, which ban evidence of women’s prior  sexual experience from rape 
trials because of the harm associated with “disclosure of personal details” see supra. If 
women are revealing their sexual selves in so public a manner,  perhaps  the priv- 
acy  concerns  that   many  thought   necessitated  rape  shield  laws  have  sufficiently 
evaporated. 
Perhaps,  because women so readily share their sexual selves with the public, they will 
no longer be mortified  during  a rape trial in which they are required  to testify 
about  their sexual past.  After all, they have texted and  sexted about  it before.  We do 
not endorse the repeal of rape shield laws, however, because our strong  guess is that  
the mortification in rape  trials  comes not  from  the espoused  reason  for rape 
shield laws (the need for sexual privacy) but from a sexual double standard that still 
judges women far more harshly for sexual activity than  men. That  double standard is 
alive and well, see infra. 
29.  See infra the section “Hooking Up”. 
30.  The two videos we discuss are of course just a small sample of what is avail- able. 
A full survey of all music videos for the contemporary period  is well beyond the scope 
of this paper, but others have provided academic analysis of music videos’ depiction of 
women’s sexuality (Wallis, 2011). Wallis’ analysis suggests that  the two 
videos we select are representative.  See also Hobbs  and  Gallup  (2011) (suggesting 
that contemporary music lyrics often celebrate sexuality without commitment). 
31.  The original video was produced  and made popular  in 2003. 
32.  Indeed,  Kelis’ arrangement bears a striking  resemblance  to traditional poly- 
gamy. The reason  she is able to get all the sexual partners  is because she has the 
best  resources.  See 2 Chronicles  11:21 (“Rehobaoam … took  eighteen  wives and sixty 
concubines”);  Judges  8:30 (“Gideon  … had  many  wives.”); 1 Kings  11:2-3 
(Solomon  … had seven hundred  wives and three hundred  concubines.”);  (Johnson, 
1987, pp. 57-58) (detailing the many wives of Brigham Young). 
33.  Though,  it might be noted,  the sex Ke$ha  desires is sober sex, not  drunken, 
out-of-control sex. 
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34.  Another   common  form  of  sexual  experience  is  known  as  “Friends   With 
Benefits,” (“FWB”)  which involves a sexual relationship  of purposefully  indeterminate  
duration between  2  people  that  are  social  friends.  With  FWBs,  there  is a friendship  
that  parties  presume  will continue,  even if there  is no such expectation about  the 
sexual aspect  of the relationship  (Owen, Rhoades,  Stanley,  & Fincham, 
2010, p. 653). 
35.  See (Paul, 2006, p. 146): “[N]onverbal  communication is predominant in the 
initiation  and experience of a hook-up.  Verbal communication is rare and is viewed by 
many students  as ‘breaking the moment.”;  (Bisson & Levine, 2009) (finding that FWB   
relationships  rarely   involve   communication  about   the   relationship). In 
describing  a “bad”  hook-up,  one man  commented  “she said some things  you just 
don’t  say  during  a  hook-up.   She  wanted  to  talk  about  how  we felt  about  each 
other”  (Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 658). 
36.  Discussing  the relative  risks and  benefits of hooking  up compared  to tradi- 
tional  dating  relationships, and  concluding  that,  although  women’s motives  differ 
from  men’s, hooking  up  “can  be much  more  egalitarian” (Bradshaw  et al., 2010, p. 
669). 
37.  Glick (2000): queer theory “encourages  us … to fuck our way to freedom”. 
38.  “[I]f I could be sure I would never have any kind of sex again, I would take a 
quick  header  off  the  nearest  tall  building”  (Bullock-Jordan,  2000, p.  232). “I’ve 
never been one of those oh-sex-is-okay-but-what’s-all-the-fuss-about kind of girls. 
More    like    the    sex-sex-where-can-I-get-more-sex     kind”    (Miya-Jervis,    2000, 
pp. 280-281). 
39.  England  et al. (2008) found that  half of their respondents  indicated  that  both 
men  and  women  initiate  dancing  or  talking.  But  those  who  did  not  believe that 
initiation  was equal overwhelming said that it was men who initiated (p. 535). 
40.  Although   it  is  always  difficult  to  track  colloquialisms,   to  our  knowledge 
“male whores” were unheard  of 30 years ago. Nor do we suspect that “male whore” 
packs the pejorative punch that “whore” packs for women. (Indeed, it may be a diminutive  
version of the “real thing,”  in much the same way that  “lady lawyer” is a lesser form of 
“lawyer”). 
41.  For   a  contrary   perspective,   see  Marks   and   Fraley   (2005),  who  offer 
empirical  evidence  in  the  form  of  two  surveys  showing  that  women  and  men 
both  suffer diminished  peer esteem as their number  of sexual partners  increases, 
and suggesting that  the so-called gender double  standard may be self-perpetuating 
(p. 183). 
42.  As many researchers observe, “slut” is not just a word imposed on women by 
men.  Women   call  each  other   sluts  (Hadley,   2003).  As  psychologist   Deborah 
Tolman  has observed,  “slut bashing  keeps sexuality under  control”  (Hadley,  2003, p. 
390). Why women feel a need to keep sexuality under  control  may be a question 
for more study by sex-positivism. 
43.  Paul and Hayes (2002) report  one man saying “it felt good but I’m glad I’m not  
going out  with someone  slutty  like that”  and  one  man  who  understood that 
talking  about  feelings for  each  other  was inconsistent  with  a hook-up)  (pp.  653, 
658). 
44.  We recognize  that  regret  and  the  lack  of  it  can  be  strongly  influenced  by 
social conditioning. Women may be taught  to regret having too much sex and men 
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may be taught  not  to. That  young  people may be conditioned  into  their  regret or 
lack thereof does not negate the need to be concerned about  it. 
45.  (Owen et al., 2010): “[I]t appears  that  hooking  up was not an experience that 
most  college students  felt positively about,  especially women. The findings suggest that 
women are at substantially more risk than men for feeling upset about  the experience.”; 
(Fielder & Carey, 2005, p. 1116): “Our finding suggest that penetrative 
ex hook-ups may lead to an increase in distress for females.” 
46.  One man summarized  his regret this way, “My beer goggles made me pick a 
dog” (Paul & Hayes, 2002, p. 665). 
47.  As we mentioned  earlier,  the baseline of no implicitly endorses  a particular 
kind of communicative,  mutual  sexual experience. 
48.  (Party  Theme  Place,  2008): “One  of  the  most  popular  adult  party  themes 
today is pimps and ho’s (sic),” and providing ideas for games and costumes). 
49.  Most  states  now  require  most  people  found  guilty  of a sexual  crime to  be 
classified as some form of “sex offender”  (Janus,  2003). As many have argued,  the 
individual demonization of sex offenders is inconsistent  with most second wave feminist 
teaching; (Janus,  2003, p. 258): (sexual offender notification  laws paint “sexual 
violence as a small and exceptional aberration” not “widespread  and domesticated); 
(Baker, 1997, pp. 578-583): (debunking  view that  rapists  should be singled out for 
special treatment because rape somehow reflects individual  pathology.  Rape reflects 
more of a general social than individual psychological problem.) 
50.  It is important to remember that despite the intensity of the debate surround- 
ing whether silence should be interpreted as consent, there is a simple solution  avail- 
able to those who are in doubt.  They needn’t risk a false rape accusation;  they need 
only ask their partner  whether she consents. 
51.  Compare   Halley  (2006)  (endorsing  the  view that  domination in  sexuality is   
episodic   not   structural)   with   (Armstrong,   Hamilton,   &   Sweeney,   2006, pp.  
490-495):  (Describing  the  hook-up  culture  on  one  college campus  as one  in 
which  “women  cede  control   of  turf,  transportation and  liquor.”   To  get  sexual 
experiences, women must enter the men’s world where “virtually  all men’s methods of 
extracting sex are defined as legitimate.”) 
52.  By declaring all but the most obvious forms of non-consent  outside the law’s 
legitimate inquiry,  we may put  the “critique  of male behavior  … out  of earshot  of 
the very men whose conduct needs to be challenged” (Phillips, 2000, p. 192). 
53.  All of these statistics  may be infected by definitional  bias. Perhaps  if we did not 
live in such a sexually repressive culture, many of these sexual encounters  would 
be more welcome, or at least less unwanted. 
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